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Between 1918-1921, Ireland was swept along by a phenonomen, the entire island 
became embroiled in a transition, from being ruled by another power, namely Britain in entirety, to 
becoming independent yet divided. This period has being well documented, analysed and written 
about, on a national scale. The active areas have received the attentions o f many historians and 
commentators. But the ‘other’ areas rarely receive a mention; the mistake is too often made of 
superimposing a blueprint that was concocted for one county, upon all the rest. True, Westmeath 
follows the general pattern that occurred in the rest of the country, that o f young men joining the 
Volunteers and becoming increasingly militant against Crown Forces, marginalised to a large extent 
from their local communities, and working more often than not on their own initiative. Also the pattern 
of the war was dictated largely, by changes in the British government’s policies in Ireland and GHQ’s 
reaction to them. Therefore the country at many stages did move as one, changing tactics to receive the 
various threats and challenges thrown at them. But the counties also followed separate paths, slight 
differences occur in the methods adopted, when these methods were adopted and to a certain degree 
who adopted them. The movement was developed along regional lines, along parish boundaries; 
therefore it was always going to form differently, depending on the attitude, politics and policies of the 
activists and the local communities reaction to them. Thousands joined the ranks o f the Volunteers 
during the latter half of the 1910s, but many did not foresee the violent role that they would be asked 
to play. After the 1916 Rising, the Volunteers who had being interned had strong reasons to become 
more militant, and from here on Volunteers were being arrested and re-arrested and in turn this 
increased their radicalism. Activists set up small nuclei by enrolling their brothers, close friends or 
work-mates. The movement spread as these small groups began to drill openly, its ranks swelled with 
the conscription crisis of 1918, when everybody realised that the Volunteers were the most capable 
body to oppose conscription into the British Army. Effectively then, the majority o f recruits were 
joining for the wrong reasons and therefore the possibility of activity was still very much in the hands
Introduction.
of a small cluster of men. The most important thing that I have attempted to convey is the fact that 
there did exist a militant section o f men in the county of Westmeath and that they did affect British 
rule in the county. The fact that activity in the less ‘active’ counties is seldom mentioned could have 
the effect of people presuming that nothing whatsoever occurred.
In the course o f this work, I will attempt to document the course of events in 
Westmeath during the War o f Independence. I have divided the thesis into three chapters. Chapter 1 is 
a chronology of events that occurred within the county in this period; beginning with the minor acts o f 
defiance in 1918, accentuating along a radical path, finally ending with total lawlessness in 1921. 
Chapter 2 assesses these events, attempting to explain the path that the county took in relation to the 
rest of the country and why different areas of the county developed conflicting attitudes and methods 
to the war. Finally Chapter 3 provides a social composition of the Westmeath Volunteers, providing 
some indication as to who joined the IRA as regards age, occupation, social class and marital status.
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CHAPTER 1.
ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN WESTMEATH DURING THE WAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE BACKGROUND TO CONFRONTATION
Westmeath was fairly active in terms of agrarian agitation in the years leading up to War of 
Independence. In fact the first shot o f the ranch war was fired not in the normal centre o f agrarian 
radicalism, the west, but in north Westmeath. On 14 October 1906, a ‘great gathering of young men’ 
assembled at the Downs to denounce the grazing system. Laurence Ginnell, MP for north Westmeath 
went beyond mere denunciation and advocated a new form of action -  cattledriving.1 During 1907-8, 
Westmeath was seriously affected by cattle driving, with a total of eighty-eight drives reported by the 
R.I.C.2
Also in 1909, Westmeath had by far the highest rate o f persons being boycotted in Leinster. 
There were a total of 67 per 100,000; Longford was the closest in Leinster with less than half of that 
figure -  33. Only Galway, Leitrim and Clare had higher. David Seth Jones describes how forms of 
agitation against landlords died down during the first three years of World War I, but were renewed at 
the end of 1917. This renewed agitation lasted until 1920, during which time it was closely linked with 
the struggle for independence. Cattle driving was renewed and untenanted and other grazing farms 
were invaded and occupied to create conacre and adjustment plots for landless men. A number of 
ranching areas were affected; the worst were in counties Clare and Westmeath.4 Fitzpatrick has 
revealed that during the War o f Independence, seizures, which GHQ had neither the ability nor the 
intention of preventing.5
1 Ir ish  T im e s ,  15 O c t  1906 , p r o v id e d  in  P a u l B e w , Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland, (N e w  Y o r k ,  19 8 7 ), p . 139.
2 R e tu rn  b y  c o u n tie s  a n d  q u a rte r ly  p e r io d s  o f  the n u m b e r  o f  ca tt le  d r iv e s  re p o rte d  to h a v e  ta k e n  p la c e  in  I re la n d  fro m  the  
f irs t  d a y  o f  1907 to  the 3 0 th d a y  o f  S e p te m b e r  1908 , p .2 , H .C .  19 0 8 (3 1 0 ), x c , 3; f ig u re s  fo r  the fo u rth  q u a rte r  o f  1908 w e re  
ta k e n  f ro m  the ce n su s  re tu rn s  s u b m itte d  to  th e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  b y  th e  C h i e f  S e c re ta ry  fo r  I re la n d , A u g u s t in e  B i r r e l l ,  
H a n s a rd  5, x v , 5 0 4  (1 7  M a r c h ,  1 9 1 0 ), c o n ta in e d  in  D a v id  S e th  Jo n e s , Graziers, land reform and political conflict in 
Ireland, (N e w  Y o r k ,  19 9 5 ), p . 189.
3 R e tu rn  s h o w in g  n u m b e r  o f  ca se s  o f  b o y c o t t in g  a n d  p e rs o n s  b o y c o tte d  in  e a ch  c o u n ty  in  I re la n d  o n  th e  3 0 th d a y  o f  
N o v e m b e r  1905 a n d  the 3 1st d a y  o f  Ja n u a ry  19 0 9 , p p . 2 -3 , H . C .  1909 (5 7 ) , l x x i i i ,  3 , p r o v id e d  in  D a v id  Jo n e s , Graziers, 
land reform and political conflict in Ireland  ( N e w  Y o r k ,  1 9 9 5 ), p. 191.
4 Ib id .
5 D a v id  F it z p a t r ic k ,  ‘ T h e  G e o g r a p h y  o f  I r ish  R e v o lu t io n ’ , in  Past and Present, lx x v i i ,  (1 9 7 8 ) , p . l  19.
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A midlands correspondent noted that IRA engagements were often thinly disguised land of the 
Freeman’s Journal, noted that in the 1918 general election, Sinn Fein had attracted the support of the 
farming community, but he believed this was only because o f the conscription menace and that they 
did not view kindly the close alliance between Labour and Sinn Fein, nor were they satisfied with the 
aggressive policy that was developing.6
An assessment o f the Intelligence Notes from 1913, illustrates the United Irish League 
were comparatively active in attempting to achieve their aims. In 1913 there were seven cattle drives 
in Westmeath, only three counties had more. In 1914 there were a further six cattle drives, and in 
1915 there were a total o f four, only King’s county had more in Leinster.
It is interesting to note here that James Hayden MP, wrote in the Westmeath 
Examiner in 1907, ‘the signs in the political sky indicate clearly that in a very short time n o t h i n g  will 
be heard of the so called Sinn Fein movement which has for its aim the termination o f the 
parliamentary effort.’7 And by the signs he was probably correct because everybody was gathering 
under a different banner. But it is will worth noticing one commentator’s view of Laurence Ginnell’s 
campaign, ‘ he (Ginnell) was a Sinn Feiner before most of us. He became famous through a dogged 
fight with his Westmeath men for land. Mountjoy jail knew him ages before it became the training
o
ground for Irish cabinet ministers.’ As a result of a cattle drive in the New Forest area, fifteen 
members of the Cloneyheigue Land League branch (Tyrellspass area) were arrested and imprisoned 
for three months in November 1908. A large crowd of supporters including three bands followed them 
as they were led off.9 One o f the men, a Patrick Seery was killed during an ambush on Clara R.I.C. 
barracks in 1920, which illustrates to some extent the fact that participants in the agrarian agitation 
campaign went on to become active members of the Irish Volunteers.10
6 W e e k ly  Freeman 's Journal, 14 J u n  19 19 .
8 ‘ R o d d y  the R o v e r ’ o f  th e  I r is h  P re s s , in  P ä d r a ig  Ó ’ L io n à r d ,  Fighting Larry Ginnell, ( D u b lin ,  19 4 5 ), p . 9.
9 O l iv e r  E g a n , Tyrellspass- Past and Present, (T y re lls p a s s ,  1 9 8 6 ), p . 4 6 -4 7 .
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Volunteer corps began to be established throughout the county in the first six months of 
1914, though there is evidence to suggest that one was established in Moate as early as the end of 
1913. They only possessed one rifle, so they drilled using wooden guns under an ex-British soldier 
named Raftery. Many of them joined the British army at the outbreak of World War I.11 Similar 
movements must have being operating throughout the county, as there was a Volunteer demonstration 
in Mullingar in summer 1914; where a grand total of twenty-seven corps numbering 3,000 men 
marched through the town.12
In September 1914, before the division into two bodies subsequently known as the 
National Volunteers and the Irish Volunteers there were a total of forty branches o f Volunteers with a 
total membership of 3,993. However, it is recorded that only 194 of the members were opponents of 
the Redmonite policy o f recruiting. Rumours abound to this day, that there had been the formation of a 
National Volunteer force in Athlone, in September 1913. The Westmeath Independent of 25 October, 
gives an account of no less than 5,000 men in 20 companies marching through Athlone accompanied
1T • • • —by bands. It would appear that nothing fitting this description happened. Michael J. Judge, a 
prominent member of the Irish Volunteers, published a forthright statement in September 1914 -  ‘ I 
must say, and I can prove what I say, that the Athlone Volunteers o f last year had no existence save in 
the wild fancies of a journalist who had dined too well and indulged too freely in the “glowing cup.’” 14 
For an objective assessment it is best to view the contemporary police reports, the report for October 
1913, states there had been no change in nationalist and labour organisations since September, except 
that, ‘a division of the A.O.H. has been established at Ballinalack, Rathowen sub district. No public 
meetings or demonstrations were held during the month save the so-called parades o f the Midland
10 Je re m ia h  S h e e h a n , Worthies o f  Westmeath, ( M o a te ,  19 87 ), p . l  13.
11 L ia m  C o x ,  Moate, County Westmeath. A History o f  town and District, (A th lo n e ,  19 81 ), p . 178.
12 P e te r  W a lla c e ,  Multyfarnham Parish History ( M u l l in g a r ,  19 87 ), p . l  14.
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Volunteers which take place at Athlone and are generally regarded as a farce in the locality.’15 In a 
report of the Crime Special Branch of the R.I.C., for Westmeath, it is stated,
‘ A press report that a force had been recently raised in Athlone, called the Midland Volunteer Force, 
to meet “Carson’s Army”, and that it had its first parade at Athlone, on 11 October, proved on 
investigation to be quite false and the police believe that the information was supplied by Mr. Me. 
Hayes, editor of the Westmeath Independent. On the 22 October fifty-four men, in fours, headed by a 
band marched through Athlone. No arms were carried and there was no drill. On 29 October, twenty- 
nine men, in fours, marched through the outskirts o f Athlone, headed by Mr. Hayes. The affair is 
regarded by everyone has a joke, and these two marches are due to the efforts of Mr. Hayes, who was 
trying to substantiate the information he had previously supplied in the press.’16
However, perhaps the exercise had some redeeming features as F.X. Martin points out, that 
‘For all its bogus nature.... The news in October 1913 about a rapidly expanding Volunteer force at 
Athlone served its purpose. It stimulated the nationalists everywhere to think hard in terms o f an 
armed body and convinced them that the British government would not be of a mind to suppress it’17 
In another return taken in the month of December 1914, the strength o f the Irish 
Volunteers is again recorded at 194, with the paltry sum of twenty-one rifles.18 In October 1914, 
twenty-four rifles were received in Mullingar from Dublin, and again in August 1915 the Ballinahown 
branch received four rifles from Dublin. By the 31 January 1916, the number o f rifles was recorded at 
nineteen.19 However, after the Rising this low number would have been depleted even further. At the
end of February 1917, the military estimated that the Irish Volunteers in Westmeath had only a total o f
20seven rifles and eight shotguns.
13 Westmeath Independent, 2 5  O c t  19 13 .
14 Irish Volunteer, 10 O c t  1913.
15 C o u n ty  In s p e c to r  m o n th ly  re p o rt , Ja n  1 917 . ( F r o m  m o w  o n  re fe rre d  to  as C l ) .  T h e s e  p o lic e  re p o rts  are c o n ta in e d  w ith in  
the C o lo n ia l  O f f ic e  p a p e rs  in  th e  P .R .O .  L o n d o n ,  b u t I v ie w e d  th e m  o n  m ic r o f i lm  in  th e  lib r a r y  at N U I  M a y n o o t h .
16 C r im e  S p e c ia l B r a n c h  re p o rt , O c t  19 1 3 , c o n ta in e d  w it h in  th e  C o lo n ia l  O f f ic e  re c o rd s .
17 F . X .  M a r t in ,  ch a p te r  e n tit le d , ‘M a c N e i l l  a n d  th e  I r is h  V o lu n t e e r s ’ , in  M a r t in  a n d  B y r n e  (e d s .), The scholar 
revolutionary; Eoin MacNeill, (S h a n n o n , 19 73 ), p . 128.
18 Intelligence reports 1913-1916, B r e n d a n  M a c  G o i l le  C h o i l le  (e d .), ( D u b lin ,  19 6 6 ), p p . 1 0 9 -1 1 2 .
19 R e tu rn  o f  a rm s a n d  a m m u n it io n  in  p o s s e s s io n  o f  th e  I r ish , N a t io n a l  a n d  U ls te r  V o lu n te e r s  1 9 1 7 , c o n ta in e d  in  p o lic e  
rep orts.
20 J e u d w in e  p a p e rs  ( C o m m a n d e r  o f  th e  F if t h  D iv is io n ,  1 9 1 9 -1 9 2 2 ) , Im p e r ia l W a r  M u s e u m , L o n d o n ,  f i le  n o . 72/82/2.
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Prior to the rebellion the county inspector wrote, ‘There are not more than a dozen who openly 
identified themselves with the Sinn Fein movement and mainly all o f them resided in Athlone. About 
half this number left the county at the time o f the outbreak, so that the county was in no way affected 
by the action of the Sinn Feiners.’
He goes on to describe that originally there was a hostile feeling towards the rebels; but 
the executions of the leading rebels, the shooting o f Sheehy-Skeffington and the alleged brutal 
treatment of people in Dublin by British soldiers, all combined to turn the feelings o f the majority of 
people into sympathy for the rebels. He states that Sinn Fein members in Athlone wore badges and 
that one church offered up Mass to the souls o f the executed. The clergy neither condemned nor 
condoned the Rising. When negotiations were taking place for the Home Rule settlement the people 
had no pronounced views. The doubt as to whether the exclusion of Ulster was to be a temporary or 
permanent arrangement prevented them from having any confirmed decision. However they were
inclined to support the Irish party in accepting temporary exclusion, but even when it seemed that it
• • * 21 could be a permanent arrangement they still remained loyal to the Irish party. By an act of 1885, the
county was divided into two divisions, each returning one member. North Westmeath had had a long
tradition of supporting the Anti-Pamellite Nationalist, James Tuite, from 1885. Since 1906,they had
been returning the more radical independent, Laurence Ginnell. Likewise in Westmeath South, the
Ant-Pamellite Donal Sullivan, had been returned from 1885, and after his death in 1907, they
supported the Independent Nationalist Sir Walter Nugent.22
21 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, Ja n  1917.
22 B . M .  W a lk e r ,  Parliamentary election results in Ireland, ( D u b lin ,  1978).
The Easter Rising in Westmeath was limited to a small show of force in the Tyrellspass area. 
According to one commentator- ‘At the Malone family home at Meedin, Tyrellspass were fired the
* 97only shots heard between Dublin and Galway during Easter 1916.’ There had been seventy registered 
Volunteers in Tyrellspass but only seven answered the call that morning, even with this low number, 
Tomás Ó Maoileóin suspected that the reason for some o f the men coming out was because they 
viewed it as an ideal opportunity to seize land. Seamus O Maoileóin, his brother and three others 
attempted to blow up the bridge at Ballycastle; they failed at this task and lifted some track instead, 
they then billeted themselves in the Ó ’Maoileóin’s house in Meedin. The R.I.C. attempted a raid on 
the Tuesday but were persuaded to leave by the firing of a volley o f shots. They returned to attempt 
the same on Thursday evening and again on Saturday morning, but once again the insurgents fired 
shots and drove them away. On Monday the Volunteers dispersed, Seamus was captured on his way 
back to Limerick where he was student. The house was again raided on the Thursday and Tomás and 
his brother Seosamh were held for a while at Tyrellspass, then Tomás was removed to Kilmainham.24 
There were a total of thirty-eight persons arrested in the county but none were tried by courts- 
martial. Twenty-six of these arrests were in Athlone Town. Eight of this number were deported an 
interned in Frongoch.
Easter 1916
23 College annual o f  Multyfarnham agricultural college, ( M u l l in g a r ,  19 8 5 ).
24 U is e a n n  M c E o i n ,  Survivors, ( D u b lin ,  19 80 ).
25 Intelligence reports 1913-1916, p .2 4 1 .
26 Westmeath Examiner, M a y  13 1916.
27 S e a n  O ’ M a h o n y ,  Frongoch, ( D u b l in ,  1 9 8 7 ), p . 2 1 2 .
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Preperation for the War of Independence
It is interesting to chart the progress of reports of an intelligence officer, based in 
the midlands over the course o f a few decisive months. In October 1916, he says, ‘the presence of the 
military and the rapid dispersal o f all armed bodies in the past rebellion have put an end to all hope of 
success by armed opposition in the future and the extremists notice this.’28 A year later he states,
‘The Sinn Fein party has not yet sufficient arms of military value... No artillery, and therefore without 
aid from Germany, can never raise an armed force that cannot be dealt with by the troops already in 
this country.’29 However there is a notable change in his tone by December of the same year- 
‘The whole Sinn Fein movement is peculiarly well disciplined, having regard to similar political 
organisations in the past. The results o f its indoor meetings are very hard to obtain. Drunkenness is 
almost unknown amongst those deeply implicated, and is apparently severely dealt with. This is. 
...foreign to the usual state o f things in similar movements’30 By March 1918 he reports, ‘ab itte rand  
aggressive feeling was gradually and generally being manifested towards the police in the midlands.’31 
Sinn Fein attempted to hold a procession through Athlone on St. Patrick’s Day in 1917, but the county 
inspector threatened them with prosecution if they proceeded with the event and they abandoned the 
idea.32 On Sunday 24 June, the Sinn Fein convention for Westmeath was held at the county council 
buildings in Mullingar, the main object was the electing of a committee for the purpose o f forming 
Sinn Fein clubs throughout the county, Arthur Griffith and Darrell Figgis addressed the meeting.33 
About 300 people celebrated the release o f prisoners in June, in Mullingar, mostly youths who 
marched up and down the town carrying flags and singing songs. In June, seditious literature was 
found being distributed at a G.A.A. match in Kinnegad and at a Ceilidh in Ballymore, the local clergy
28 C h a r le s  T o w n s h e n d , The British campaign in Ireland, ( L o n d o n ,  19 78 ), p .6
29 Ib id . p. 6.
30 Ib id . p. 7.
31 Ib id . p . 7.
32 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt , M a r  1917 .
33 MRWN, 2 8  J u n  1917 .
influenced both.34 Another Sinn Fein demonstration was held in Mullingar in July, 5000 people 
attended it; the main speakers were DeValera, Figgis and Ginnell. There were similar meetings held at 
Athlone, Moate, Castlepollard and Moyvore during the month. Further meetings followed in August, 
in Drumraney and Moate. On the 30 September, 400 Sinn Feiners marched through Athlone after 
Requiem Mass for the late Thomas Ashe.36 (Ashe was a republican prisoner, who had died when the 
authorities attempted to force feed him while he was on hunger strike.) Interestingly, on the 2 October, 
twenty boy scouts escorted two Sinn Feiners to court, who were charged with assaults on soldier’s 
wives. During the proceedings Sinn Fein flags were unfurled and hung from the gallery.37 October 
witnessed the first cases of groups o f men marching in military formation, with a total o f five separate 
incidents in Mullingar, Walshestown, Kilbeggan and Kinnegad. There were further large-scale 
meetings and cases of drilling in November; in Mullingar, Athlone, Moate, Kinnegad, Tyrellspass, 
Castlepollard and Kilbeggan. Sinn Fein spread like wildfire through 1917, in January there were only 
two clubs in existence with a total membership o f forty, it grew steadily during the year and by 
December there were a total o f twenty-four clubs with 1,238 members.37
Swords are Drawn
The first reports of illegal drilling in 1918 appear in Kilbeggan and Ballynacaragy; the local parish 
priest supported the latter. Besides drilling the main objective of the Volunteers would obviously have 
to be the procurement of arms. As early as January 1918, British soldiers were been approached with 
this intention. Twice Joseph McMahon was arrested in Mullingar for committing this offence and on 
the second occasion was sent to Mountjoy, his accomplice on the first occasion was acquitted. Raids 
for arms, first come to the attention o f the British forces in April 1918. Though it is probable that 
friendly locals, sympathetic to the cause, had already donated many shotguns. Illegal drilling
34 MRWN, 21 Ju n  1917, Westmeath Examiner, 14 J u n  1917.
35 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, J u l 1917.
36 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, O c t  1917.
37 Westmeath Examiner, 4  O c t  1917.
37 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rts , J a n  a n d  D e c  19 17 .
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continued to increase throughout the early months of 1918 until it had reached epidemic proportions in 
April and May, with a total of twenty-five drills reported. This sharp increase can be attributed to the 
conscription crisis in March. The general population reacted strongly against this and were 
determined to resist it. The banners that they could all group under were Sinn Fein and the Irish 
Volunteers. Also the holding of large meetings became quite common in March and April 1918.38 The 
first of these was on St. Patrick’s Day in Mullingar, organised by Sinn Fein. The main speakers were 
Count Plunkett and Patrick Brett (President o f Sinn Fein in Westmeath); there was little enthusiasm 
amongst the 1,100 onlookers. However only a month later a monster crowd numbering 10,000 
gathered in Moate to attend an anti-conscription meeting. A large number of clergy attended. On 21 
March, there were twenty-one similar meetings held the length and breadth of the county.40 There 
were a further eight meetings throughout the rest o f the year. In December there were fourteen 
meetings held to canvass for the upcoming election.41
The police did not react to these open displays of nationalism for quite a while, it was 
not until the final week of June that they broke up a meeting at Kilbeggan, seized banners and arrested 
the ringleaders. During the same week, the authorities arrested eight men for illegal drilling at Moate; 
they were sentenced to between one and two months imprisonment, they however appealed and were 
released on bail.42 In August, there was a Sinn Fein meeting held and once again the authorities 
arrested the ringleaders. But the number o f arrests for the rest of 1918 is alarmingly low, with just 
four more. This figure is surprising, especially since in October 1918, 500 people were arrested nation­
wide under the Defence o f the Realm Act. However, the amount o f illegal activity decelerated to 
almost a standstill in the last third of the year, with only one large meeting and absolutely no open 
displays of marching in a military manner. There were however, five raids for arms reported to the
37 Westmeath Examiner, 4  O c t  1917 .
37 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rts , Ja n  a n d  D e c  1917 .
38 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rts , Ja n  to  M a y  1918.
39 Midland reporter and Westmeath nationalist, ( f r o m  n o w  o n  re fe rre d  to  as M R W N ) ,  23  M a r ,  19 A p r  1918.
40 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, A p r  1918.
41 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rts , M a y - D e c  1918.
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authorities all occurring in October.43 This general slackening of activity is attributable to the tougher 
stance that the authorities began to adopt. Field Marshal Viscount French, the lord lieutenant to 
Ireland, issued proclamations in fourteen counties declaring Sections 3 and 4 of the 1887 Crimes Act 
to be in force. Under this Act he could now issue Special Proclamations naming certain organisations 
in these counties as ‘dangerous counties’; eventually they would be declared illegal.44 Open displays 
of militant nationalism were now resulting in arrest and prosecution. Compounded to this, GHQ had 
placed a ban upon open drilling; consequently the movement went underground and commenced 
small-scale training.
During the course of the year both the Irish Volunteers and Sinn Fein increased their 
membership considerably. The Irish Volunteers began the year with four branches and 149 members, 
in December they had eight branches and 750 members. Sinn Fein began the year with twenty-four 
branches and 1,270 members and finished the year with twenty-seven branches and 2,068 members.
Cumann na mBan increased from one branch to three, and the National boy scouts from one to 
two. All the other bodies remained more or less stagnant with the exception of the United Irish 
League whose branches declined by four and whose membership tumbled from 1,110 to 872 and the 
Trade and Labour League, which doubled its membership.45 In a letter dated February 2, 1919 the 
Adjutant -  General tells the O/C of the Athlone brigade, ‘I am glad to hear that you are going ahead 
with the brigade work and hope you are getting things into some sort of shape. It is hoped that some 
of your officers will put a little more work into it than they usually do.’46 Obviously the Volunteers in 
Westmeath were beginning to organise themselves.
According to Joost Augusteijn, between 1918-1920 there was a movement towards violent 
confrontation, most apparent in Tipperary and Dublin but not in Mayo although it had up till now been
42MRIVN, Ju n e  2 7 , J u l 4  1918.
43 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt , O c t  1918.
44 C h a r le s  T o w n s h e n d , The British campaign in Ireland, (O x fo r d ,  1978), p . 10.
45 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt , Ja n  a n d  D e c  19 18 .
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equally defiant.46 Throughout the whole o f 1919 in Westmeath, there were no attacks on the R.I.C. or 
reports of malicious injury. In fact the police only found the necessity of baton-charging unruly 
crowds, in July of 1919. There were four separate incidents of rioting crowds being baton-charged, 
one in Athlone, one in Castlepollard, one in Delvin and one in Mullingar, all of these took place in 
June and July. The incident in Mullingar occurred after an Aeirideacht, when a stone-throwing crowd 
in military formation attacked a group of R.I.C.47 There is further evidence to suggest that elements of 
the general public were becoming more militant. In August 1919, Mrs Sheehy-Skeffington attempted 
to address a crowd at Kilbeggan, the police baton charged the crowd, but the crowd fought back, with 
the result that two R.I.C. men were stabbed. Although their injuries were not serious, the incident 
illustrates a heightening of tensions. At first glance it would appear that nothing was being done about 
the shortage of arms, as there were only four raids for arms reported to the police, and all four only 
resulted in the procurement of three shotguns and two revolvers. It is however highly probable that 
more activity did take place. Drilling was now being conducted in secret and it is likely that most 
raids for arms were not reported to the police, as weapons were either handed over voluntarily or if 
this was not the case. Those who were raided were too afraid to go to the police. In July the police 
found out from a source that shots had been fired at the parochial house in Delvin, Father Tuite had not
48reported the matter and wished to keep it quiet.
Crown Force response to radicalisation.
It would seem that the police were well informed about the republican movement. 
For although there was very little activity from the republicans, the amount of arrests and subsequent 
imprisonment’s is impressive. There were a total of twenty-eight arrests in 1919, of these fifteen were 
sent to prison, eight bound to the peace and five discharged. Eight of the arrests were a direct result of 
cattle driving; the majority of the rest were as a result of unlawful assembly or intimidation.
46 Jo o st  A u g u s te ijn ,  From public defiance to guerrilla warfare, ( D u b l in ,  19 9 6 ), p p .8 7 -1 2 3 .
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Most of these arrests were carried out during large meetings, of which there were a dramatic increase, 
there were a total of twenty-two during the year.49 The impact of these arrests had to have had a 
profound effect on the republican movement; it probably wheedled out many of the more moderate 
members, the ones who had entered the movement for fun, as an escape from their normal, mundane 
rural existence. On the other hand there is no doubt that it radicalised the Volunteers who spent time in 
prison, and who would now be willing to adopt more radical methods. However the Volunteers 
developed methods, to resist the increase in the number of arrests and subsequent imprisonments. 
Prisoners immediately went on hunger strike with the result that they were prematurely released, 
jubilant crowds gathered on railway platforms cheering their return. This had the effect of 
transforming their releases into propaganda rallies, turning them into heroes in the eyes of the public. 
For example on 31 January 1919, Joseph McMahon was arrested and sent to Mountjoy, on 28 
February he was accorded an enthusiastic reception at Mullingar station after been released on hunger 
strike.50 However, although there was a possibility of being accorded hero status, it was no easy 
decision to become an active Volunteer. On 3 November 1919, the bishop of Meath brought down the 
curse of God on the perpetrator who shot an RIC constable in Ballivor (Co. Meath).51 In such a strictly 
religious society, evidence like this illustrates that Volunteer activists were at this time very much 
marginalised from the general public. According to O’Donoghue, the fact that there was no support 
form the ecclesiastical authorities and to a lesser extent the press, was a constant source of pain and 
heart-searching, for the Volunteers.52 But according to Kee, the fact that the British government never 
rethought their policy on Ireland, continually administering repressive measures, made it easier for 
Volunteer extremists to convince their moderate Sinn Fein supporters, that the fight for nationalist
53principles was indeed as brutal and violent as the Fenians had always said it must be. A great 
example of this was the sense of outrage at the Soloheadbeg incident, being replaced by anger towards 
the Crown Forces for the subsequent imposition of military restrictions. Augusteijn adds to this slant ‘ 
a feeling of separateness from Britain which up till now, the Fenians had to argue was being created
49 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rts , Ja n  to  D e c  1919.
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and consolidated by the British government with its refusal to offer Ireland anything but military 
force’54
Although in the general elections of 1918, the Sinn Fein candidate Laurence Ginnell was returned 
with a massive majority, the general public were not for a violent campaign against the crown forces. 
At a meeting of the County Council in August 1919, they declared,
‘We condemn in the strongest terms language can afford the murders and other outrages that have 
been occurring in various parts of the country. We consider every one of these crimes as a stain upon 
the national character of the country. We believe that they are engineered by dangerous pests of 
society, who have not the slightest sympathy with the welfare of the country. We hope that the solemn 
warnings of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy, who have expressed condemnation, will have the desired 
effect of putting an end to such outrages in the future’. 55
Another deterrent to becoming active was the toughening stance that the authorities had 
embarked on. There were eight arrests on 7 June after a gathering in Kilbeggan was forcibly dispersed 
and one in Castlepollard for illegal drilling. This stance was continued in the county through August 
1918, when Christopher Daly was arrested in Mullingar at a Sinn Fein meeting and MJ Kennedy was 
arrested in Castlepollard for addressing a crowd. Raids for arms continued through 1918 but were very 
sporadic; three in April, one in August and five in October, drilling stopped entirely after August, a 
reflection of the toughening stance adopted by the authorities. The political strength of the movement 
however remained formidable witnessed by the large meetings that were prevalent throughout the 
year.56
Augusteijn points out that some activists realised that it would take the crown forces to spur the 
locals into action.57 Possession of arms was the main gripe that most companies complained about, but 
only the 2 areas of Kilbeggan and Mullingar embarked on more than one raid (with 11 and 8
52 F lo re n c e  O ’ D o n o g h u e , No other law, ( D u b l in ,  19 54 ).
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respectively) during the entire war.58 It is true, the other areas could have received weapons from 
sympathetic locals, but this surely could not have been so abundant a source as to rule out any other 
method. The other explanation is that the locals in these areas were being raided, but were too 
intimidated to report anything to the authorities. But with the exception of Athlone, all the other areas 
were much less active than Kilbeggan or Mullingar, so this would hardly be plausible.
As a result of the upsurge in violence in the country in 1920, the Crown Forces evacuated many of 
their more indefensible outposts thus leaving vast areas unpoliced. The policy was conducted on a 
national scale and therefore although Westmeath had not being active, barracks were evacuated around 
the county. Sixteen of the thirty-two barracks in the county were destroyed or evacuated by the end of 
War.59 The Volunteers began burning these evacuated outposts to ensure that they could never be re­
occupied. These burnings were an excellent means of keeping the rank and file interested, without 
exposing them to too much danger or risks of being arrested. It also highlighted which men could be 
depended on for more serious missions. To a large extent the effectiveness of individual companies 
was always going to depend on the capability of a small core of individuals. In some of the more 
active areas such as Tipperary, the emergence of violent conflict actually resulted in a dramatic decline 
in the organisations membership during 1920, as half-hearted members began to drop out. This was 
not the case in Westmeath, where the membership actually rose from 882 to 962 as an extra company 
was formed.60 The fact that there was not as much activity as in other counties, would have meant that 
half-hearted members were not going to be called on to do anything too serious. A successful barrack 
attack became less and less feasible as the weakly fortified posts were abandoned, but Westmeath 
unlike some counties continued to attack barracks after the summer of 1920, with five of their six 
attacks happening after this time. A new activity was adopted nationwide - disrupting the lines of 
communication and transportation. This comprised of trenching roads, cutting telegraph wires and 
raiding the mails. Its benefits were threefold -  it protected the men ‘on the run’, it provided the rank 
and file men with something to do and it helped procure intelligence. An epidemic of this nature
58 T h is  f ig u re  is c o m p ile d  f ro m  a c o m b in a t io n  o f  C l  re p o rts  a n d  the n e w s p a p e r  re p o rts  o f  the Westmeath Examiner and 
MRWN.
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broke out in August 1920 and lasted until the truce. To quell this upsurge in violence, the British 
government introduced the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act in Augustl920, which allowed for 
internment and court-martial of civilians. This led to a massive increase in the number of arrests with 
forty-eight arrests in September alone (forty of these however were following a raid on a arbitration 
court). Nineteen were arrested in October, twelve in November and five in December.61 Most active 
men who were not on the run already, now did so, this led to the development of the flying columns 
throughout the country. This meant that counties, which hitherto had being inactive, began to become 
more and more radical. The end of the year was characterised by an upsurge in violence. In August, 
an RIC constable was murdered in Athlone; in October a party of military were fired at on Lough Rea 
and Athlone barrack was bombed; in November Constable Larkin was murdered and Constable 
Ashcroft was wounded on the arm; in December an ex-soldier was taken out of his home and 
murdered. In Mullingar the military were held up and shot at, in two separate incidents. There were 
six attacks on the R.I.C. in Kilbeggan from July to December of 1920. In October, in Castlepollard, up 
till now an inactive area, two magistrates were kidnapped. Outside of Moate, there was an attack on a 
Black and Tan patrol with the result that one was killed; also in November another ex-soldier was
taken out of his house and shot dead. In June 1920 there was a violent attack on Clara R.I.C. Barracks.
62In July Streamstown barracks was also attacked. However arrests of leading IRA officers never 
relented and this seriously depleted their resources. A cooling- off period occurred but only 
temporarily, with no attacks upon R.I.C. in January 1921.
The measures taken by the Crown Forces in 1921 had seriously reduced the number of possible 
targets; as a result activists began looking for alternative targets. Civilians, who were seen as 
responsible for Volunteer arrests, made for prime targets. There were three ex-soldiers and one 
informer shot dead in the county during the course of the war. Added to actual casualties, were acts of 
intimidation on ex-soldiers, there was an attempted murder of an ex-soldier and one had his house
60 Ib id .
61 Ib id .
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burned down. There was also a case in Castlepollard where a man was dragged out of his home and 
made swear that he would not join the R.I.C. Similar to this incident, an R.I.C. man who was on 
leave was warned to not return to the force he subsequently tended his resignation.64
Approaching the end of 1920, most flying columns were disbanded and the men returned 
to their battalions, where they became involved in small operations. These men however had become 
far more radicalised and they brought this influence to bear in their local areas, so instead of activity 
dissipating, it continued. A slackening off period did occur in January, but attacks on the Crown 
Forces continued thereafter. With two in February, three in March, five in April, six in May, six in 
June and four in July.
ALL BETS ARE OFF
In January 1920, the Volunteer Executive endorsed violent attacks upon crown forces. The delegation 
sent to the Paris Peace Conference had failed to gain any international support and in September the 
Dail had been suppressed. So it appeared to the movement, that political means had failed, the only 
way now to pursue independence was through militant action. GHQ sent out orders to all of its 
provincial brigades, to destroy all government communication and administrative instruments. 
Volunteers in Kilbeggan on New Years day raided six homes, (one was actually on New Years Eve) 
searching for arms. They managed to gain five shotguns and a number of sporting cartridges. In one 
of the raids when they failed to procure arms, they fired shots in annoyance or frustration and left. The 
Cl states ‘none of the occupants could identify them (but) of course they knew who they are but are 
intimidated’. Also on New Years Eve, three motorcars were fired at, in three separate incidents in 
Mullingar.** On 19 January, a civilian was shot at and the first attack upon the RIC occurred. A car 
belonging to wealthy businessman P.J. Weymes, was fired at about a half a mile from Mullingar, the 
chauffeur was wounded by shards of glass. The police immediately set about investigating the 
incident and were fired upon. They captured three of their four assailants; finding a Smith &Wesson
63 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, A u g  19 20 .
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revolver on one, ammunition on another and seditious literature upon the third. Micheál McCoy, 
Patrick Byrne and Terence Smith were removed to Mountjoy; a large crowd gathered on the platform 
and cheered as they left.67 An escalation in activity occurred throughout the county. There were 
twenty-one cases of blocking roads, five cases of malicious damage, six raids for arms, three cases of 
intimidation and one attack upon the mails in the month of January. Two young men were detained 
under the Defence Of the Realm Act (DORA) -  Joseph McMahon and Christopher Whelehan both of 
Mullingar, McMahon was discharged but Whelehan was sent to Mountjoy, the following week he was 
released, he was carried from the Mullingar court shoulder high.68 On 18 March, a young Volunteer 
named Stephen McGuinness was arrested in Kilbeggan on charges of illegal drilling. While he was 
been tried inside the courthouse a large group of Volunteers paraded outside in military formation 
cheering.69 These two incidents, especially the first, illustrate that public opinion was changing to 
some extent, as regards the escalation in aggressiveness adopted by the Volunteers.
Seamus O’Meara a butcher from Athlone, O/C of the Athlone brigade, states that he was called 
to a meeting at GHQ in Dublin at the end of 1919, and was told that it was time that the Volunteers 
became more active, he was ordered to lead attacks on police barracks from February 1920. At a 
brigade council meeting it was decided that they would attack the police barracks at Ballymore on 26 
February. O’Meara picked men and officers from the Athlone and Coosan areas. Six of them were 
from the Summerhill area (Co.Meath) and some of the officers were from the Faheeran (Co.Offaly) 
company. The mission was botched, when the local Volunteers, who were responsible for bringing the 
rifles bolted when they saw the lights of a British lorry and suspected that it was a raid. O’Meara 
states,
‘Some men were court-martialed for what happened. It is only fair to realise that while some men 
were willing to fight, they did not like the fight to be near their own houses. Not everybody was 
prepared to risk his people’s home especially at that time.’
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He continues to detail that he was responsible for the planning of the southern part of the
• • 7 f)county along with first battalion south Roscommon. This practice of companies from different 
counties bonding together, would tend to point to the fact that there were not enough dedicated or 
capable activists within the county and that they needed to draft in activists from other areas.
GHQ ordered burning of courthouses and evacuated barracks, and raiding of tax offices for 
Easter 1920. These were the first operations for many of the up till now dormant companies. They 
really separated the rank and file, between those who were willing to carry out daring actions and 
those who were not. Small groups of activists, small pockets of individuals who were willing to risk 
life and take life, to achieve their goal, carried out military operations. Other men who were listed as 
members of the company were only used for mundane jobs. The Cl reported in May 1921, ‘I am of 
the opinion that the average strength of a company is between 10-15 and of this number only a 
percentage are dangerous’.71 The lack of arms reinforced this strategy as only a few men could operate 
at any one time anyway. Violence continued to mount; the Cl recorded forty-two indictable offences in 
May 1920.72 Rumpf and Hepburn, argue that the presence of a bellicose and charismatic leader made 
all the difference in the amount of activity in an area. Seamus O’Meara had been called to GHQ at 
the end of 1919, where he was ordered to force the Volunteers in his brigade area to become more 
active.74 The initial results were poor with failed ambushes and no cases of the burning of evacuated 
barracks. In May he promised progress, GHQ replied ‘you will agree it is not up to your 
neighbouring brigades.’ 5 He obviously had been purposely vague to GHQ, to cover up the 
incompetence of his brigade, as in this same letter the A/G states ‘you say the barracks were burned to 
the ground. Could you be more definite and let me know the exact number that were burned.
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Would this not be a clearer way to make your report?’76 after this letter, the IRA did begin to become 
bolder in their methods of establishing their authority on the county -
‘During a local election in Mullingar members of IRA stationed themselves outside the polling booths 
for police duty. They commandeered the County Hall in the name of the Irish Republic and converted 
it into a temporary barracks. The Republican soldiers arrested a number of persons for riotous conduct 
and locked them in the guardroom of the County Hall.’77
There were two attacks on RIC barracks at Clara (Co. Offaly) on the 2 June, and at Crazy 
Corner (Mullingar area) on the 23 June. For the attack on Clara, trees were felled and placed on the 
road to prevent military assistance arriving form Athlone. A Volunteer named Patrick Seery from
7 0
Ballinagore was killed during this attack. (Mentioned above as been involved in cattle driving in 
1908). Crazy Comer barracks had been evacuated and although it was not burnt to the ground, it was 
smashed up enough to make it uninhabitable. Also on the twelfth, the military and police at 
Ballnacargy noticed the courthouse was on fire but were able to bring the blaze under control before it 
caused too much damage. I realise that this is not enough evidence to equate the increased activity in 
Westmeath solely with O'Meara, but it does point to the fact that he was quite a capable officer who 
possessed some powers of motivation. Other examples of the departure from minor acts of disturbance 
occurred on the fourth of the month. Two lines of railway were removed between Inny Junction and 
Streete, with the result that a train was derailed, miraculously nobody was injured, the motive was to 
facilitate an attack on the local police barracks which in the end did not take place. Also on the fourth, 
Gaulstown house was brunt to the ground, it had been unoccupied for two years but rumour had spread 
that the military were about to reoccupy it. The month finished with another decisive blow against the 
Crown Forces, when 4,000 gallons of petrol consigned for the Royal Air Force at Oranmore, Co. 
Galway were destroyed at Mullingar railway station. The RIC received a call from the employees of 
the railway at three o’clock in the morning stating that one hundred armed men had held them up.
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The police arrived on the scene and managed to salvage 1,250 gallons, they suspected however that the 
railway employees had carried out the damage with the help of some civilians.79 Besides these attacks 
on the Crown forces, there were a lot of offences carried out by the civil population. There were five 
cattle drives during the month at Ballynacarrigy, Castletown-Geogheon, Ballagh, Castlepollard and 
Mountemple. The leaders of the Castletown drive were named as Patick Tuite, James Spollen and 
Owen Reilly; these men were however all prominent Sinn Feiners. Intimidation and sending of 
threatening letters was also prevalent, creating an aura of fear around the county for those who were 
enemies of the IRA.80
On 8 July major security precautions were taken to ensure the peaceful holding of the Assizes 
at Mullingar. According to one report the ‘courthouse was taken over by military.. .Sentries were 
placed in front of the courthouse.... Armed soldiers taking positions in the indoor of the building 
facing the streets.’81 Six evacuated barracks were burnt to the ground at Glasson, Littleton, Killucan, 
Delvin, Streamstown, and Brawney during the month of July. Streamstown barracks was attacked on 
the twenty-fifth.82 According to the Cl, between eighty and ninety armed men carried out the attack. 
Supposedly a sergeant and two constables, successfully fought off this highly unlikely number.
Seamus O’Meara was involved in the attack, along with officers and men from the second and third 
battalions. According to his account, they ambushed two RIC men on their way to mass at Boher.
Two of the Volunteers disguised themselves in their uniforms. By O’Meara’s account only ten 
Volunteers were involved. When they arrived at the barracks they noticed the steel shutters were 
pulled down. They realised that the police would have called for assistance and they had less than an 
hour before military assistance would arrive from Mullingar. They attempted an attack but failed and 
withdrew when the military arrived. The military escorted the police to Mullingar and the Faheeran
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company burned down the barracks the next night.83 On the last day of the month Constable
♦ 84McDonald of the R.I.C. was held up and robbed in Rochfortbridge.
To combat the escalation of violence that was occurring in certain parts of the county, the 
British government introduced the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, which was passed on the 9 
August 1920, allowing for the internment and court-martial of civilians. In some parts of the country 
this resulted in a large number of arrests. There was no immediate flurry of arrests in the month of
o r
August or September in Westmeath, but in October there were fourteen IRA arrested.
As mentioned above, in August Volunteer Forces carried out the first murder of a member of 
the Crown Forces. An R.I.C. sergeant named Thomas Craddock was singled out because he had taken 
part in ‘the burning of Cunningham’s house and in the beating of the owner.... if he was left alive we
87believed a lot of the town would be burned down.’ He was killed while leaving the ex-soldiers hall
in King’s Street, Athlone at midnight in early August. There was another policeman with him named
88Mahon but he managed to escape. After the murder the Curfew order was placed on large parts of 
the town. There were three further attacks upon the R.I.C. in August. On 3 August, a bicycle patrol 
consisting of five RIC was ambushed between Kilbeggan and Rochfortbridge, by what the Cl 
describes as a large party of masked and armed men. Constable John Phelps was shot in the arm but 
they managed to fight off their assailants wounding some of them in the process. On the 24 August, 
Constable William Grier was held up in a Kilbeggan pub by three armed and masked men and relieved 
of his revolver and seven rounds of ammunition. Another constable was shot at but not hit, in 
Collinstown (Castlepollard area). Lawlessness continued to prevail throughout the month, especially
89with a massive increase in the holding up and stealing of mails of which there were six cases. Also in 
August, Sgt. Brennan retired on pension. Constable Roche was suspended for refusal to carry arms and
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Constable McGovern resigned on the same grounds. Both refused to carry arms as they claimed that it 
was ‘tantamount to a challenge to the people.’90
CROWN FORCE RESPONSE TO OPEN WARFARE
This leads us to examine the way in which the county was policed and how the authorities reaction to 
the situation, resulted in the escalation of violence. Many of the population had lost faith in these 
representatives of British authority in Ireland, the IRA through persuasion and intimidation had 
convinced the general populace that they were the defenders of the community, as a result these two 
forces became bitter enemies vying for a position that they regarded as rightfully theirs. The 
government had made many blunders in policy, which helped the Volunteers gather further support. 
People had regarded the arrests of the people in Athlone after the Rising as unjust, because they had 
not engaged in any violent activity. There was a ban issued by the military in July 1917, forbidding 
drilling, the wearing of uniforms, singing nationalist songs; basically forbidding all the paraphernalia 
that was representative of the Volunteer movement. But in reality it was impossible to arrest people 
for these minor offences, simply because there were too many people involved. The authorities 
attempted to maintain order by arresting the leader figures, this failed however as an appearance in 
court or a spell in prison was considered something of a status symbol, defining loyalty to the 
movement. The court cases themselves became propaganda events. Most activists were not deterred 
by their convictions. Some of them strengthened by previous prison experience immediately went on 
hunger strike to demand political prisoner status. After the death of Thomas Ashe in Mountjoy, 
through being force-fed, political status was granted in most prisons and to avoid creating martyrs, 
many prisoners were released way before their time. To re-impose some sort of threat, the Temporary 
Discharges Act or the Cat-and-Mouse Act, was put into force in March 1918. By this Act, it became 
possible to release hunger strikers and when they had fully recovered, they could be re-arrested and 
forced to serve the remainder of their sentence. There were raids for arms at this stage but only in
90 MRWN, 5 Aug 1920.
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preparation for a confrontation, or to provide the Volunteers with greater political clout. Hardly 
anybody at this stage was prepared to kill. Many counties had followed the Sinn Fein guideline issued 
in April 1919, which directed that police should be boycotted. But there is no evidence to suggest that 
Westmeath treated the police any different until as late as August 1920, although there were calls by 
political leaders within the county for a boycott. On 27 April 1919, Ginnell and Fr. O’Flanagan 
addressed 500 members of the Gaelic League in Delvin and advocated boycotting the police.91
The closure of outlying barracks and centralising manpower led to a further decrease in the 
power the RIC exerted over the local population. As early as January 1921, the Cl was calling for 
barracks that had been closed a couple of months earlier, to be re-opened to assert control over lawless
Q9 • •areas. To curtail this spiralling escalation of violence, the government brought in the military and 
increased their powers to search houses and intern suspects. Added to the new powers they were 
reinforced by new recruits from England, in the form of the infamous paramilitary units, namely the 
Auxiliaries and the Black and Tans. These units became infamous for their harsh treatment of the 
general population, which had the effect of turning anybody not already a sympathiser of the IRA into 
one.
The Restoration of Order Act was introduced in August of 1920. But the IRA did not abate, in 
November 1920 there was a massive increase in activity but now with the presence of the new 
paramilitary organisations, November also witnessed the beginning of retaliatory measures by the 
Crown Forces in Westmeath.
FORMATION OF FLYING COLUMNS
The police definitely stepped up operations at the end of 1920 in Westmeath, with a total of 
twenty-four arrests of ‘leading’ IRA men between October and December 1920. However this did not 
have the effect of lessening activity in the more extreme pockets of the county.93 Attacks on the RIC 
and on their barracks continued until the end of the year. The increased arrests and raids on homes did
91 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, A p r  1919.
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have the effect of forcing many of the Volunteers to leave their homes and go on the run. This was the 
start of the forming of the flying columns. There is evidence to suggest, that there were three flying 
columns operating within the county. But none were solely a Westmeath operation. The very famous 
North Longford flying column ran sorties in and out of Westmeath territory, and had an outpost at 
Finea. Colonel Seamus Conway decided to move the column in the direction of Streete in Co. 
Westmeath, to carry out a small engagement there with a view to luring a transport patrol from 
Castlepollard to Rathowen. He states that they ambushed a Tan patrol at Streete wounding one of 
them, he says, ‘that this was just a bait to catch a larger fish’, but the truce was called two days later.94 
There was another column that operated between south Westmeath, south Roscommon and north 
King’s county. Since early 1919, the south Roscommon and south Westmeath Volunteer units had co­
operated as the Athlone brigade.95 A third column operated on the Meath border led by a man named 
Michael Finn. The third battalion, fourth Meath brigade, was centred in Delvin.96 However it is 
important to point out that in the fifth Division’s intelligence they made no mention of any of these
• 07
when they were listing Flying Columns in their area. Their intelligence would most certainly have 
known of the existence of any active columns, perhaps they did not believe that any of these column’s 
were a massive threat and that they could be contained by local forces.
In October, the Cl opens his report on an optimistic note stating that activity is beginning to 
slacken and that good feeling is eventually been shown to the police. But this runs contrary to the 
evidence of what was going on in the county. The court at Mullingar Quarter sessions had to be 
abandoned due to lack of jurors. On the twenty-ninth, all work was suspended throughout the county 
to commemorate the death of the Lord Mayor of Cork. The nineteenth, saw the setting up of a flying 
column in the county. James Tormey, an ex-British soldier was selected as column commander. 
Altogether there were five ex-British soldiers in the column. There were three further attacks upon the
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Crown forces, but for the first time the military were attacked which illustrates a growing confidence 
on the part of the Volunteers. On 7 October, a party of military were returning from a boat trip on 
Lough Rea when they were fired upon form the shore near Coosan. A Major Adams, a Lieutenant 
Hudson and Privates Allport and Bradley, of the 1st Leicester Regiment were all wounded.98 The 
report states that 50-60 men attacked them, which is highly improbable. There were four arrests made 
immediately after the attack. Seamus O’Meara states that the attack was carried out as a reprisal for the 
burning of the premises of the Westmeath Independent, by Black and Tans. Members of the Coosan 
company carried out the ambush.99
E-company of the first battalion was situated in Faheeran, Tubber parish, County Offaly and 
was in the Athlone brigade area. Their intelligence had established that a police convoy was to pass 
through Moate on the twenty-second of the month. It was decided that they would ambush it at 11a.m. 
at Parkwood. It was to be conducted by the Flying Column. The convoy consisted of three Crossley 
Tenders and one motorcar. The ambush was botched as they only managed to stop one of the tenders. 
They killed the driver and severely wounded another. The original plan had been to seize their lorries, 
arms and ammunition, put on the occupant’s uniforms and attempt to bluff their way into the barracks 
at Moate. On the night of the ambush an official statement was issued from Dublin Castle stating that, 
‘A party of police numbering nineteen were ambushed at Parkwood, King’s county. A rifle bullet 
killed the driver of one of the cars and another constable was slightly wounded. The fire was returned 
and one of the attacking party was seen to fall.’
At about seven in the evening the Tans left Parkwood to return to Athlone. Along the way they 
fired wildly and indiscriminately into houses. Many families left the town that night, while the Crown 
Forces patrolled the streets and searched houses; they shot two civilians, one in Moate and one in 
Athlone.100 The Cl states that ‘he military were heated and it is alleged that shots were fired at
98 N a m e s  re c e iv e d  fro m  C o l l in s  P a p e r s  in  M i l i t a r y  A r c h iv e s ,  f i le  n o . A / 0 4 3 7 .
99 S e a m u s  O ’ M e a ra , Capuchin Annual 19 70 , p .55 1 .
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them.’101 After this engagement the flying column was split up, five men were sent to Moate, two to 
the third battalion and two to the first battalion with orders to shoot any police or Black and Tan they 
could. 102
Continued escalation in violence, in October.
On the sixth, Constable Corbett at Finea shot a farmer named Patrick Thompson dead. The 
constable was of duty at the time, but he was not convicted of any crime because there was not enough 
evidence against him.103 Two weeks later, the Cavan to Mullingar train was stopped by ten armed 
men, who stated that they were searching for Constable Corbett, fortunately for him he was not 
unboard. 104 Another action, which shows that the Volunteers were beginning to become more 
audacious, was the kidnapping of two magistrates, Scott Moore R.M. and G.P. Hyde J.P, while on 
their way to Petty Sessions at Castlepollard. They were released the next day, however fourteen arrests 
were promptly made, twelve of whom were identified as connected to the crime and sent immediately 
to prison where one died.105 The deceased was named as Michael Flynn of Glanidan, according to a 
newspaper report he was subjected to harsh conditions and other alleged cruelties.106 So it would seem 
that very militant actions were reacted to with the herding up of all local suspected activists. Although 
the same newspaper maintains that Flynn was in no way politically involved. On the sixteenth of the 
month, a bomb was thrown at the police barracks in Athlone, one constable was slightly injured. The 
evacuated police barrack at Ballinea was destroyed on the twenty-seventh.107 The Cl concludes his 
report stating ‘that the police and military are becoming stronger and breaking them (the Volunteers)
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The Cl opens up his report for November with,
‘Sinn Fein and other organisations do not have public meeting in halls as before. They.... have many 
opportunities of interchanging ideas such as on Divine Service on Sundays. The next arrests of 
leading IRA men are likely to have a good effect.’
On the twenty-third and fourth, arrests were made of leading IRA men, they were immediately 
taken into military custody.109 On the 2 November, a Black and Tan named Larkin was killed during 
an ambush at Auburn near Athlone. He was part of a party that was on their way from Carrick-on -  
Shannon to Athlone, for the purpose of attending a court-martial. Three other constables were 
wounded and one Volunteer named Seamus Finn was killed. Local Volunteers from the Ballymore 
company carried out this attack, members of the Drumaney and Tang companies helped them; all of 
which were attached to the third battalion, Athlone brigade. There were three rifles and twenty 
shotguns for the twenty-three volunteers that were involved, again highlighting the number of 
Volunteers being used as being totally reliant on the number of weapons available. It is interesting to 
note that Fr. Casey the local priest gave them his blessing and general absolution before they left. 
Displaying a changing attitude if not in the Church, at least in the views of the priests at local level.110 
The day before a Sgt. Walker of the East Yorkshire Regiment, was held up on Grove St. in Mullingar 
and searched, but he had no arms in possession. On the same night two shots were fired at a military 
sergeant in Mullingar. On the fourth, a constable Ashcroft was shot on the arm and on the thigh, the 
incident happened immediately after the police had searched Lawrence McGuires licensed premises.111 
On the same night, an ex-soldier named White was shot and critically injured, in Clara by the 
military.112 In October-November 1920, a dramatic difference can be noticed in the pattern of the war. 
Retaliatory tactics by Crown Forces really only begin in earnest. From October 1920 to the Truce, 
there were seven cases of arson, nineteen cases of a malicious damage and three cases of murdering 
civilians. But the real figure would be much higher due to the fact that my estimation is heavily reliant
109 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, N o v  1920 .
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on what the Cl includes in his reports. The military were also forcing civilians to repair roads during 
the day, which they had probably being forced by the IRA, the night before to trench. O’Meara says 
that the military burned houses in Drum and Moore, as reprisals for the Auburn ambush and that they
1 1 Tentered two pubs in Athlone and four houses in the surrounding area and broke them up. However, 
the IRA was also marshaling its own reign of terror on the civilian population. Martin Lyons, an ex­
soldier was taken out of his house in Moate and shot dead, as it was known he was friendly with the 
police. Also the house of Peter Judge was entered, he received three bullet wounds, he was a known 
thief around the town of Kinnegad.114 On the 15 November, barracks were evacuated at Ballinagore, 
Crazy Comer, Stoneyford, Moyvore, Lisclogher, Coole and Fardrum.115 This further increased the lack 
of control that the Crown Forces had on the county as it left greater areas of land unpoliced and subject 
to IRA control.
The Cl eventually admits in December, that the county is in an unsatisfactory state. Malicious 
injuries, arson, robberies of mails, cutting of roads and telephone wires and a case of attempted murder 
comprise the chief crimes. The case of attempted murder was of an ex-soldier named Anderson in 
Delvin. An RIC man was fired at and wounded on the arm in Kilbeggan, once again retaliatory 
measures continue, the county at this stage had really fallen into a state of general lawlessness with 
both sides causing malicious damage to property. Sinn Feiners shot Jas Blagriff, under the suspicion 
that he was an informer. The Cl estimated that there are about eighty members of the IRA are on the 
run at this time. 116
The high number of arrests continues into 1921, with fifteen men interned during the month of 
January, there were also five men committed for the offences of courts-martial, possession of firearms 
and possession of seditious literature.117 In February, the authorities noticed some improvement in the
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centre of the county but the borders adjoining other counties were still in a bad way. A body was 
found in a shallow grave in Clonmacnoise (Co. Offaly) graveyard, it was identified as that of James 
Tormey aged 21, an ex-British soldier who had commanded the ASU (Active Service Unit), first 
battalion, Athlone brigade. The authorities believed the man was shot on 2 February, when a party of 
eight police was attacked at Comafulla, near Creggan (Co. Roscommon). It is also learned in this 
report that his brother Joesph Tormey who was captured at the end of 1920 was shot dead by a sentry 
in Ballykinlar internee camp on January 1921.119 The bad areas at this stage were outlined as 
Castlepollard, where the main activity engaged was the cutting of the roads; Kilbeggan and Athlone 
were engaged in the more serious activities of raids and ambushes. Three huge operations conducted
by the military using 100-150 men yielded no results. They began to resort to smaller-scale operations
120of twenty to thirty men, which produced seventeen important arrests.
In March, disruption of transport and communication lines continued, especially in the 
Castlepollard area, the C.M.A prohibited markets and fairs there. The most dangerous part of the 
county was that which bordered King’s County. There were no Crown forces there, and it became a 
haven for men on the run. Also there was constantly drilling on the borders of Co. Meath. Fifteen 
people were arrested during the month and there was evidence to bring seven to trial by court-martial, 
the rest were interned. Two people were committed by courts-martial during the month, for illegal 
possession of firearms. There was an attack upon a patrol of police, which included Captain Corbett 
DI, on the Kilbeggan/Mullingar road. They successfully fought off their attackers and claimed that 
they wounded a few in the process. Also at Kilbeggan on 2 March, a single, military dispatch rider
was held up and relieved of his motorcycle. On the fourteenth of the month at Castlepollard special
121Constable Clarke was fired at but not hit.
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A type of epidemic of violence breaks out in April and lasts right until the truce. The Cl 
amazingly opens his report stating that, ‘I believe that the public are tired and see that Sinn Fein are 
beaten.’ Yet on the very first day of the month there was an attack upon Kinnegad R.I.C. barracks, 
attempting to intimidate them into ceasing their investigations and for the arrest of the local Volunteer 
named Beglan (who subsequently escaped) . The R.I.C. suffered no injury, but they believed that 
they inflicted casualties upon their attackers. Also on the first of the month, Lance-corporal Sydney 
Freakly was shot on the arm as he was cycling through Athlone, four arrests were made in relation to 
this incident.124 A hand-to-hand struggle occurred on the Conaught side of Athlone, between two 
R.I.C. and two Volunteers. The police officers were wounded, but not seriously and one of the
19^  • ■ •attackers was shot three times. There were a total of thirty-nine indictable offences during the 
month. Other serious crimes included the murder of a Robert Johnston in Moydrum; the Cl states that 
it was done for the purpose of spreading intimidation. Rochfortbridge barracks was also subjected to a 
sniping attack. The Cl states, ‘the recrudescence of attacks on Crown Forces, a form of outrage which 
the county has been free from the some months, is probably due to the presence of an ASU Unit on the 
Meath border.’ There were eighteen arrests for political offences, five of which were convicted by 
courts-martial, receiving sentences ranging from twelve months to five years. Evacuated RIC barracks
19 f tat Johnstown and Collinstown were destroyed.
There were three attacks upon the RIC during the month of May. On the seventh, police were 
ambushed at Rathowen. The fight lasted one hour and then the raiders fled. However they only 
succeeded in wounding one constable. Another attack took place at Kinnegad, when two police were 
ambushed, according to the police report they fought gallantly and managed to wound one of their 
assailants and capture another. The Cl estimates that at this time, each company was only ten to
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fifteen strong and that only a small percentage of these men were actually dangerous.127 The impetus 
for the Rathowen ambush would seem to rest with members of the North Longford flying column.128 
An R.I.C. man was murdered in Ballinacarrigy when he was set upon by a group of about 50 men.129 
Nine arrests were made during the month, four of which were dealt with by court-martial, the rest were 
to be interned. 130
There were thirty outrages reported during the month of June, but the Cl believed that there 
were many more in remote parts of the county of which nothing had yet been heard. The escalation in 
violence continued to spiral, with the murder of Head Constable James McElhill in Kilbeggan and the 
murder of Col. Commandant Lambert in Coosan (Athlone) on June 20.131 The original motive had 
been to kidnap Lambert and use him as a bartering tool for the release of the then captured Sean 
McEoin (leader of Volunteer forces in Longford) but when they failed to stop the car in which 
Lambert was travelling in, they shot him instead. The capture of McEoin was a serious blunder on 
behalf of the Mullingar Volunteers; they had been informed that the train on which he was travelling 
on was to be searched on arrival in Mullingar to look for him. They were supposed to stop the train at 
the Downs and get McEoin to safety. Although the battalion officer who received these orders was 
arrested the night before, the orders still reached the local company but they did not act upon them.
The result was that McEoin was captured and seriously wounded upon his arrival in Mullingar.132 An 
intelligence officer in the Mullingar brigade, emphasised how grave this insubordination was - ‘an 
event that affected the entire movement and that may have damned the Mullingar company ever 
since.’133 GHQ was furious at this incompetence, they ordered that McEoin was to be rescued, local 
companies lay waiting on the routes to Dublin to ambush the entourage that was removing McEoin to 
Dublin. But the military were wise to the fact that attempts would be made to rescue their prisoner and
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they took an alternative route to the city.134 After the murder of McElhill, Lambert himself imposed a 
strict curfew on the county consisting of ‘except in the Urban Districts of Athlone and Mullingar. All 
persons shall remain indoors between the hours of 2230 hours and 0500 hours and that within the 
Urban Districts of Athlone and Mullingar, all persons shall remain indoors between 2300 and 0500.’ 
Two days after Lambert had released this statement he too was dead. After Lambert’s murder murder, 
Lieut. -Colonel Challenor imposed further restrictions. He banned the use of cycles in certain parts of 
the county; he forced licensed premises in Glasson and Ballydeeran to close their doors at 1800 house 
each day .135 Although General Jeudwine stated that ‘his brigade will best avenge his death.. .By strict 
adherence.. .no reprisals’, a week later the Black and Tans burned five farmhouses in Coosan, they 
then moved onto Mountemple and burned Anne Hannaly’s house, her son was in prison for IRA 
activity.136 On 3 July, sixty armed men surrounded the home of Lord Castlemaine at Moydrum, gave 
the occupants five minutes to get out and then burned it to the ground, causing one hundred and fifty
1 T 7thousand pounds worth of damage. Augusteijn relates how Peter Hart revealed that at first glance all 
these cases of malicious damage appear as random, unconnected attacks but on closer analysis they 
become a series of interlocking reprisals.138 An audacious plan had also been hatched to kidnap 
Granville Wilson of Street, as he was a first cousin of Sir Henry Wilson and would therefore be a very 
valuable hostage. However the plan was botched and Granville left the country. Once again the trend 
of the authorities keeping astride of the escalating violence is illustrated in the huge amount of arrests 
that they succeeded in making. There were twenty-eight political arrests during the month, five of 
which resulted in courts-martial, the rest were interned. Also two IRA men, who had been on the run 
were committed to penal servitude for life. The Cl sincerely believed that the general population were 
tired of the lawlessness -  ‘I feel that there would be a chance of this becoming more articulate if (1) 
the press were prevented from assuring the people that the Black and Tans are responsible for the 
lawlessness and (2) that the county was quite sure the government meant to put down the lawlessness
134 P a d ra ic  O ’ F a r r e ll ,  p p .4 9 -5 0 .
135 J e u d w in e  p ap e rs , f i le  n o . 72/82/2, A p p e n d ix  x v (e )  a n d  x v (d ) .
136 L e c tu re  b y  D r . T e re n c e  D o o le y  in  N U I  M a y n o o t h ,  N o v  2 0 0 0 .
39
and not deliver them over to some settlement to the authors of this lawlessness.’ He also cites 
obstacles that are preventing him achieving better results. He states that he needs more men and also a 
different method for dealing with cases, because the methods he has to use are too cumbersome. For 
example a court-martial practically put a whole district force out of action for two days and every 
summons served took a patrol of eight instead of the former number of one. On 9 July, there was 
considerable mobilisation to prevent witnesses getting to Dublin. The road was mined two miles west 
of Kinnegad, however it exploded prematurely and the rebels fled. Other serious crimes included the 
exchange of fire between a patrol from Kilbeggan and armed rebels on the King’s border. The matter 
ended with the fleeing of the rebels and the finding of a ‘Sam Browne’ hat with a bullet through it. On 
the twenty-seventh, the courthouse at Ballymore was burned to prevent Petty Sessions been held.
There was also an incident of a big house burning when the mansion of Major Tuite was razed to the 
ground.139 Also at Creggan, Athlone forty men burned down the house of Captain Davin who was in 
England at the time of the occurrence. There were three more attacks upon Crown forces. One at 
Ballymore and one at Drumraney, in both of these cases, nobody was injured and the raiders escaped 
without a trace. However on the third of the month the police found the body of a man outside 
Kilbeggan. There were several bullet holes in the body and the words “spy [sic] and informers beware 
of the IRA” were attached. On the eleventh the courthouse at Castlepollard, was burned to the ground, 
because it was been used as a British court. Four days later at 11:30, there was an attack on the police 
barrack in Castlepollard. The Cl states, that although the attack was unexpected the large number of 
raiders were defeated and fled the scene, he also believes that a number of the rebels were wounded. 
This attack occurred on the actual day of the truce, in fact during the period from the first to the 
eleventh, the IRA was particularly active. The Cl states that ‘though the newspapers inaugurated the 
spirit of the truce some days before it came and military orders inaugurate did two days before it was 
due, the IRA kept up the attempt to murder police till the strike of noon on (the) 11th: from this an ill
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augury for peace is drawn.’140 During the attack on the barrack, fire was directed chiefly on offices 
occupied by the DI and HC, which pointed to a deliberate attempt to take their lives on e hour before 
the commencement of the truce. Also on the ninth there was ambush at Streete conducted mainly by 
the North Longford Flying column, they succeeded in wounding a Black and Tan. 141
CONCLUSION
What is written above is a chronological account of the activities of the Irish Volunteers in 
Westmeath, during the War of Independence. There is evidence to support the idea that there did exist 
a core of very radical Volunteers who were willing to take life and to endanger their own, to achieve a 
Republic. However they were isolated from the general public, because of their methods. Apart from 
the hotbeds of activity -  Kilbeggan, Moate, Castlepollard, Mullingar and Athlone, the rest of the 
county was satisfied with minor acts of defiance. There is no doubt that Sinn Féin had widespread 
support throughout the county and that an anti-British feeling was prevalent. Recruiting for the British 
Army remained at virtually nil for the duration of the period; there was a general adherence to the 
institutions of alternative, republican government; there were numerous public demonstrations in 
support of the republicans, returning prisoners received rapturous welcomes and the election results 
were positively republican. But the majority of the general public were not willing to become 
aggressive and believed that those who did were wrong to do so. Augusteijn states, ‘that one of the 
main causes for the wide variation in levels of activity and violence was the lack of central control in 
the initial states of the conflict.’142 This meant that the motivation for action was solely in the hands of 
local leaders, who were able and willing to work independently. Townshend emphasised that the 
performance of IRA units in 1920-21, depended entirely on the initial impetus in 1918-19 -  ‘thereafter 
no amount of prodding from above could spur on slow starters to make up lost ground.’143 This
140 C l  m o n th ly  re p o rt, J u l 1921.
141 I b id
142 J o o s t  A u g u s te ijn , p .3 4 2 .
143 C h a r le s  T o w n s h e n d , ‘ T h e  Ir ish  R e p u b lic a n  A r m y  a n d  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  G u e r r i l la  W a r fa re  1 9 1 6 -2 1 ’ , English 
Historical Review, x c iv  (1979), p .3 2 2 .
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however does not hold true for Westmeath, the Volunteer movement was fairly moderate until late 
1920, but once the first steps on the road to militancy were taken, a snowball effect occurred. 
Townshend also holds that Volunteer companies never entirely accepted the control of GHQ,144 this 
may be true but here is evidence to suggest that Westmeath companies were directly influenced by 
GHQ orders. There was a major increase in engagements, following the official sanction of violence 
from Dublin, also when GHQ ordered the burning of barracks in Easter 1920, it was also immediately 
acted upon.
Sinn Fein membership boomed during the course of 1917, and the Irish Volunteers grew 
steadily through 1918. There was a start to open drilling in late 1917, but only in certain areas, and it 
was these areas that became the centres of radical activity. At first drilling was used as a tool of 
defiance against the crown forces, but by the end of 1918 it went underground, as the authorities began 
to arrest the leaders of these drills. Likewise large meetings were unheard of at the end of 1918, 
whereas they had reached epidemic proportions at the start of the year. They re-emerged at the 
beginning of 1919, but apart from circulation of seditious literature, evidence of threatening letters, a 
few cases of malicious damage and four raids for arms there was hardly any Volunteer activity, 
throughout the year. The only real sign of a militant and aggressive element was the fact that during a 
number of the large meetings the crowd became unruly and when the police intervened they were 
attacked. 1920 began with immediate urgency as regards IRA presence, the number of all types of 
activity surged during the course of the year. Attacks on police barracks became quite common from 
May and serious ambushes of crown forces became common from July. The authorities did fight back 
as the number of arrests and imprisonment’s increased sharply during the course of the year. By 1921 
a series of tit-for-tat measures between both sides are witnessed as the county fell into general 
lawlessness.
144 T o w n s h e n d , Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848, (O x fo r d ,  19 83 ), p p .3 3 2 -3 3 3 .
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CHAPTER n
Analysis of the pattern of the war that developed in Westmeath 
Introduction
The Volunteers in 1919 were standing on the brink of a major phenonomen, in two years they 
would succeed in an aim that had thwarted generations of their countrymen before them -  securing the 
end of British occupation. One would think that to achieve this monumental aim that they had 
developed a master strategy, that many magnificent military minds had conceived, which was accepted 
by the masses, who joined together to implement it. The reality was most different, the movement was 
haphazardly formed with no formulated plan and a hazy aim, it appeared to achieve the support of the 
masses, but when examined closer the majority of supporters were not entirely committed to military 
confrontation. Ranks were swelled during the initial period of the movement when the sum of its 
activities was drilling, but as the War began and it became dangerous to associate with the Volunteers 
the masses fell away. It was reduced to small cores of individuals who attempted to carry out the task 
that the public had committed themselves to. It was these men who radicalised their methods from 
small acts of defiance to major acts o f war; Westmeath followed the rest of the nation in this pattern. 
During the course of this chapter, I will attempt to analyse this process and find out why certain men 
who developed their outlook from one of boyish mischief, to one of hardened brutality.
Divided attitude
Even at first glance at the occurrences in the county during the war, definitive areas can be 
witnessed as being the major arenas of confrontation. Certain areas were motivated to take up arms 
against Crown Forces, whereas other areas were satisfied to idly stand back and do absolutely nothing. 
For the process of this analysis I will divide the county into two major urban centres -  Mullingar and 
Athlone. For the rural districts I will divide the county into 8 rural centres being -  Kilbeggan, 
Castlepollard, Finea, Kinnegad, Moate, Delvin, Ballymore and Ballinacarrigy. These are areas where
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there was some semblance of activity, there were other areas in the county where absolutely nothing 
occurred but it would be impossible to account for these areas for the sake of comparison due to the 
lack of source material. I have tried to include all places into one or other of these spheres because 
chances are that activists would have being recruited and operated in a wide range from their actual 
base. There were however, some places that I was forced to exclude, as I could not ascertain a sphere 
for them.
One of the reasons given for inactivity is the presence of a big garrison in a town. The restraint 
that it gives is two-fold; firstly the chances of been found out and captured are obviously higher and 
secondly, a garrison was of great financial benefit to a town. The latter was definitely paramount in the 
minds of the people of Mullingar. The Mullingar Town Commissioners wrote,
‘Towards the end of 1916, the people of the town were on the brink of starvation, the working classes 
having received no increase in wages while the cost of living increased by 50-60%.. .It is evident that 
the barracks in Mullingar was a major source of revenue to the town and any time it lay idle, 
particularly during already harsh times, it was a loss to the town.’145
In March 1919, the East York’s arrived by train to Mullingar, the iconography which greeted 
them would point to a deep republican feeling in the town, but the reality which faced them was vastly 
different. As they left the station they were greeted by messages of ‘forward the revolution’, ‘up the 
rebellion’ and ‘prepare for the coming struggle’, painted on the walls. They discovered however that 
the town was not full of the ‘rabid Sinn Feiners’, depicted by the English newspapers, but that they 
were actually welcomed by the general population.146 James Hynes who worked as a post office clerk, 
and was an integral part of the IRA’s intelligence in Mullingar pointed out,
‘It should be borne in mind that the Mullingar Brigade operated under the noses of a large military 
garrison and one of the greatest police concentrations in the provinces, whereas county companies 
carried out their operations with a comparatively remote degree of disturbance, detection or danger.’147
145 P a tr ic ia  G ib n e y ,  ‘ T h e  M i l i t a r y  in  M u l l i n g a r ’ , p .2 6 .
146 The Snapper, m o n th ly  J o u rn a l o f  the E a s t  Y o r k s h i r e  R e g im e n t,  M a y  1919 .
147 S ta te m e n t o f  V o lu n t e e r  Ja m e s  H y n e s ,  in  p r iv a te  h a n d s, s u b m itte d  to  the p e n s io n s  b o a rd  in  19 5 8 , c o n ta in e d  in  P a t r ic ia  
G ib n e y  thesis .
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But evidence does not concur, there were thirty arrests in the county during 1918, only six of 
these occurred in the two large towns with garrisons, the rest occurred in rural areas. Albeit eight were 
agrarian, but fourteen political arrests took place in Kilbeggan, one after a raid for arms and two for 
possession of arms, the other seven were from a large meeting that was baton-charged by the police, 
and a further four were arrested for unlawful assembly. In 1919 there were twenty-three arrests in the 
county, eight of which were in the garrison town of Athlone but there was only one in Mullingar. Four 
of the arrests in Athlone were the result of agrarian agitation, two for unlawful assembly, one for 
illegal drilling and one for soliciting a soldier to sell a rifle. There were a further two arrests in 
Kilbeggan, but there were also six arrests as a result of agrarian agitation in Littleton (in Moate area). 
In July and August of 1919, there were four mass gatherings, which turned unruly, three were in rural 
areas and were baton-charged and arrests were made, but the one that took place in Mullingar was not 
so strictly dealt with. The Cl reported the matter as ‘a slight disturbance between military and Sinn
148Feiners in Mullingar.. .quickly suppressed and steps taken to prevent any repetition of it.’ The 
newspaper reports of the incident were not so dismissive of the matter. According to the Westmeath 
Examiner, there were 200 soldiers and 400 civilians involved. After a time they were separated, but 
70 or 80 civilians remained singing rebel songs, the area was just cordoned off and they dispersed at 
their own free will, some three house later.149 Of course it is obvious that with so many involved the 
soldiers may not have been able to disperse such a mob, as easily as they would a smaller crowd in the 
rural areas. It is also of interest to note that the same newspaper regarded much of the disturbance as 
been attributable to strangers who had come into town to attend a Sinn Fein meeting which was been 
held the next day.
There were a total of 114 arrests in the county in 1920; this figure represents a gigantic 
increase. There were a seemingly massive amount of arrests in Athlone with a grand total of forty- 
four, but forty of these were conducted after a raid on arbitration court in Athlone, and all bar one were 
released the following day. In the other urban centre, Mullingar, there were only nine arrests all year,
148 C l  m o n th ly  rep o rt, J u l 1919.
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yet it was an area of much activity during the year, with a total of thirty-one indictable offences 
reported to the police. Castlepollard’s number of arrests is surprisingly high, as there was very little 
activity in comparison, with a total of only eleven indictable offences, yet there was twice the amount 
of people arrested. What is even more interesting is the fact that they were all arrested at the same 
time. After the kidnapping of two magistrates, fourteen suspects were rounded up, one of whom died 
in custody.150 Therefore it would appear that for serious matters, the police applied serious pressure to 
make sure that such instances would not happen again. There were serious crimes in Athlone and 
Mullingar that did not excite the same reaction from the police.
There were a total of 126 arrests in 1921. It becomes difficult to create a geographical 
breakdown of arrests for 1921, as internment without trial had become very common, the newspapers 
therefore do not carry any trial news and the Cl tends to lump the entire amount of people interned into 
one group and does not differentiate their origins.
It would appear on this evidence that the rural areas were policed more stringently. It is true 
that police presence in these outlying areas was not what it once was, according to a newspaper report 
there were formerly three police stations on the road between Mullingar and Kilbeggan; they had all 
been evacuated.151 There had being a total of thirty-two R.I.C. barracks in Westmeath, but as the chart 
below shows by the end of the War of Independence this number had being exactly halved to sixteen, 
thus leaving large areas of the county unpoliced
149 Westmeath Examiner, 19 J u l 19 19 .
150 MRWN, 4  N o v  1920.
151 MRWN, 8 Jan  1920.
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DATES OF WHEN BARRACKS WERE EVACUATED AND DESTROYED IN 
WESTMEATH
TABLE 1.
Centre Station Evacuated Destroyed
Mullingar Ballinea 27.10.20
Ballinacarrigy (outhouses 
burned)
Crazy Comer 15.11.20
Killucan Hut 13.07.20
Kinnegad (attacked)
Rochfortbridge (attacked)
Stonyford 15.11.20
Milltownpass
Mullingar
Athlone Athlone
Ballinahown Wood
Brawney 7.20 31.07.20
Far drum 15.11.20
Glasson 7.07.20
Littleton 7.07.20
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Castlepollard Castlepollard (attacked)
Clonmellon
Collinstown 8.20
Coole 15.11.20
Delvin 27.7.20
Fore
Lisclogher 15.11.20
Multyfarnham
Rathowen
Moate Moate
Ballinagore 15.11.20
Ballymore
Castletown-geoghegan
Kilbeggan
Mounttemple 8.20
Moyvore 15.11.20
Streamstown 7.7.20
Source: Compiled from Cl reports and the newspapers Westmeath Examiner andMRWN.
The strength of the R.I.C. force in the county on September 3 1918, was one County Inspector, 
three District Inspectors, with an effective strength of four Head Constables and 203 of lower ranks. 
This is equal to thirty-five men to every 10,000 of the population as in 1911. The county was divided 
into four districts -  Mullingar with nine stations, Athlone with six, Castlepollard with nine and Moate
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with eight.152 Strength of R.I.C. stations varied; in Mullingar there was a total of seven sergeants and 
seventy men (forty of whom were Auxiliaries), Kinnegad had five sergeants and eleven men, 
Castlepollard had four sergeants and twenty men and Rochfortbridge had four sergeants and twenty- 
one men.153 The return for military in the county on 25 December 1920, was forty-nine officers and 
1,147 soldiers. On July 16,1921 it was fifty-five officers and 1,261 men.154 They were divided up as 
follows:
TABLE 2.
MILITARY STRENGTHS IN WESTMEATH ON JULY 16,1921
Unit Location Officers Rank and File
1st Battalion Leicestershire Regiment Athlone 15 614
Detachment of same Athlone Castle 1 28
1st Battalion East York’s Regiment Mullingar 16 345
Detachment of same Kilbeggan 1 30
Detachment of 1st Royal Dragoons Athlone - 3
R.A.S.C. Athlone 17 197
R.A.S.C. Mullingar - 9
R.A.M.C. Athlone 2 8
R.A.M.C. Detachment of 17th Company Mullingar 1 1
R.G. Detachment of 59th Field Company Athlone " 14
R.C. of signals Athlone 1 6
M.P, Athlone - 3
Detachment of 3rd Tank Battalion Athlone 1 3
Total 55 1261
Source: Jeudwine papers, file no. 72/82/2.
152 Thom’s Directory, (Dublin, 1919).
153 Mulcahy papers, in U.C.D. archives, Chief o f  Staff o f  IRA correspondence files, 1921 for Westmeath.
When a closer look is taken at the dates of when barracks were destroyed or evacuated, some 
interesting results are exposed. In almost every case, the areas where there was still a barrack 
operating, were the areas that were the most active. By the end of the war in the Mullingar barrack 
zone; Ballinacarrigy, Kinnegad, Rochfortbridge and Milltownpass were still operating, and in all these 
areas except the first, there was a lot of activity whereas Ballinea, Crazy Comer, Stoneyford and 
Killucan were all closed, yet there was no activity in any of these four. The same is true of the Moate 
area; Moyvore, Ballinagore, Mountemple and Streamstown were closed and there was no activity in 
any of these areas whereas Moate, Kilbeggan, Ballymore and Castletown-geoghean all operated until 
the end of the War, yet all except the last were areas of activity. The only exceptions to this pattern 
were Delvin in the Castlepollard zone and Glasson in the Athlone zone. Perhaps local companies 
thought that once they had successfully ejected British rule in their local area they had done enough. 
More likely however was that once their area was clear the brigade focused its energies on other areas. 
Also in the evacuated areas there was no need to disrupt transport or communication lines, there 
probably was a prevalence of intimidatory tactics on people who did not accept the new governing 
body of law and order, but there was no police presence to record any crime.
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TABLE 3.
INDICTABLE OFFENCES IN WESTMEATH 1918-1921*
Road Malicious Malicious Raids for Raids on R.I.C
Damage* Damage Injury Arms Mails Attacks Total
Athlone 0 20 3 2 11 12 48
Mullingar 12 17 6 8 17 4 64
Kilbeggan 15 14 1 11 12 13 66
Castlepollard 5 7 1 1 12 3 29
Finea 2 5 0 1 4 2 16
Kinnegad 3 3 0 1 2 4 13
Moate 0 7 2 2 2 5 18
Delvin 0 1 0 1 1 2 5
Ballinacarigy 2 2 0 0 2 2 8
Ballymore 1 2 0 0 3 2 8
Other ** 1 4 0 3 0 0 38
Total 41 82 13 30 66 49 283
Source: These figures were compiled from a combination of Cl reports 1918-1921, and from the 
newspapers -  Westmeath Examiner and Midland Reporter and Westmeath Nationalist.
(Note: In such counts as indictable offences I am not including in the figures agrarian offences that
were strictly agrarian i.e. ones were there is no tract of IRA influence.)
* This chart purposely omits the indictable offences of possession of arms and seditious 
literature, and cases of intimidation.
** Road damage is inclusive of trenching roads, cutting telegraph wires and raiding mails.
*** Other represents areas where indictable offences were committed, that could not be categorised
inside the spheres of the 10 centres.
It is interesting to chart militant actions of the Volunteers in each of the ten centres. There were 
no cases of illegal drilling reported by the Cl for the urban centres of Mullingar or Athlone during 
1918. For the same period however there were fourteen cases in Kilbeggan, ten in Delvin, eight in 
Castlepollard, three in Ballinacarrigy and two in both Moate and Kinnegad. However during the same 
period there were seven large meetings in Mullingar. In Kilbeggan there were two 
large meetings, the first of which was baton-charged, perhaps illustrating that the police in the rural 
areas were far less tolerant of these mass shows of resistance. It is also of interest that following an 
attack upon the R.I.C. on 3 August, between Kilbeggan and Rochfortbridge, six young men of the 
farming class were arrested. The prosecution’s evidence depended mainly on the testimony of 
Constable Phelan, who had been shot during the attack. Phelan identified the defendants and stated 
that he had known them for about eight years. All of the defendants produced alibis, but they were not 
other activists or family members.1551 believe this to be of the utmost importance as it indicates that 
the IRA had strong support from the local population in Kilbeggan. In other parts of the county people 
would gather and cheer released prisoners but to lie in court for them is another matter entirely. All 
the defendants were acquitted. One other a Joseph Daly had his case adjourned, in order that there 
would be more time for the preparation of his defence. Kilbeggan maintained its position has the most 
radical area of resistance, throughout the War; there are many reasons for this. The area had a strong 
tradition of resistance, the only rising in the county in 1916 had occurred in the neighbouring parish of 
Meedin, and the influence of the Malone’s who had led that incident was still prevalent.156 Also GHQ 
had sent down an organiser in early 1918; a young, dedicated and charismatic young man named Ernie 
O’Malley.157 It is evident that the Kilbeggan battalion heeded orders from GHQ; such as in early 1920, 
when GHQ authorised raiding houses for arms, there was an immediate reaction in Kilbeggan, there 
were six raids for arms reported to the Cl in the first week of January.158 They were probably the best 
equipped to commence military operations. Augusteijn argues that if a locality took the initiative to
155 MRWN, 2 Sept 1920.
156 C.Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellowes and the Irish Revolution, (London, 1971), pp. 53, 83.
157 Cl monthly report, Apr 1918, and Ernie O’Malley, On Another M an’s Wound, (Dublin, 1979), p.79.
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engage in violence, a process was set in motion, in which action and reaction lead to a spiralling 
severity of conflict.159 Volunteers in Kilbeggan had engaged in early activities such as drilling and 
raiding for arms, some of them had been arrested and sent to prison. Here they radicalised their views, 
also the authorities knew who was involved, when crimes were committed, they harassed these mens 
families further strengthening their resolve. Consequently they were willing to commit serious 
offences and so a pattern develops. Generally therefore those areas that initially were active, remained 
at the forefront for the remainder of the conflict.
From Table 3, it can be deduced exactly where various activities were taking place. 
Kilbeggan had a total of thirteen attacks on RIC, Athlone came in second with twelve attacks, but 
nowhere else was there more than five attacks. Moate had five attacks, but it must be remembered that 
the attacks in Moate, Athlone and to a certain extent Kilbeggan, often involved the same activists. 
There were twenty cases of malicious damage in Athlone and seventeen in Mullingar during the 
course of the year, with the slightly less number of fourteen in Kilbeggan. This undoubtedly illustrates 
that the potential for radical acts of violence existed in the urban areas, but they were not so capable or 
daring to attack the R.I.C. and risk the consequences of such a confrontation. Perhaps the core activists 
only attacked crown force patrols in open country, where the chances of being captured were very 
slight. It is definitely the case that the number of indictable offences is in fact greater, as large areas of 
the county were unpoliced and therefore outrages went unrecorded. It is interesting however to note 
that in the list of arrests during the Civil War, there were only four listed as coming from 
Killbeggan.160 However there were a massive forty from Moate and surrounding areas, surely the area 
with the most radical activists would have more anti-Treaty or at least would have more belligerent 
divisions than anywhere else. This reinforces the theory, that many Volunteers may have operated in 
Killbeggan but were not originally from there, perhaps fighting in Killbeggan because of a weakened 
police presence or the support of the local community there. It is certain that the South Roscommon 
and South Westmeath brigades had banded together and formed an ASU, which was responsible for
158 Cl monthly report, Jan 1920.
159 Augusteijn, p.343.
160 Figures supplies by Tom Cuffe, gathered from Military Archives.
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the Parkwood, and Comafulla ambushes which took place nearby.161 The majority of men on this 
column were Moate men. They had an array of ex-British army to train them in the form of James 
Tormey and George Adamson from Moate and Michael Gaffney and Bill Casey from Ballymore. 
However it must be stressed how few men actually took part in these ambushes, only four men took
— 1 ft 9part in the Comafulla ambush. This points to the extent of how peripheral the IRA were in the 
county.
Garvin states that there is nothing spontaneous about the revolution that it was the combined 
efforts of two groups of activists over two generations. 16j This is usually confined to national level but 
it could hold true for local level as well. Killbeggan and Athlone were the only areas it would seem 
where there had been a good deal of IRB influence due to the presence of the Malones and visits by 
their contact Liam Mellowes. ‘He used to cycle to Athlone, Birr and Tyrellspass where he stayed with 
the Malones.. .(in Athlone) he reported to Peader Melinn.. .Apart from soldiers the largest part of the 
population worked in the woollen mills. These were closed for annual holidays.... There were plenty 
of people with time on their hands and Mellows was able to recruit what proved a very active 
sluagh.164
HOW IS ACTIVITY IS MEASURED?
In comparison to more active counties like neighbouring Longford, Westmeath was fairly quiet 
and is referred to as a ‘rest county’. But it depends on how ‘activity’ is defined. If it is solely 
enumerated on the basis of casualties inflicted on the Crown Forces, Westmeath can definitely be 
referred to as ‘inactive’. There were three R.I.C., two Black and Tans and one British soldier killed by 
IRA forces, which in comparison to ‘active’ counties is a minute number. But if we define ‘activity’ 
as disrupting British rule and imposing an alternative ruling body on the people, then Westmeath could 
be described as being a very active county. An t-Oglach stressed in April 1921, that activities such as
161 Seamus O’Meara, Capuchin Annual 1970, pp.548-553.
162 Liam Cox, p. 186.
163 Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland, (Oxford, 1987), p.5.
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raiding mails and trenching roads were important and referred to them as the ‘small jobs’.165 In 1921 in 
Westmeath, there were forty-two raids on mails and seventeen post offices were also raided. There 
were also thirty cases of roads being trenched and communications being disrupted.166
There were a total of thirty-seven attacks on Crown Force patrols, ten attacks on evacuated 
barracks and six on occupied barracks. However these did not return the desired effect of inflicting 
casualties on the enemy. For many of the earlier attacks this had not been the intention, often they just 
tied up R.I.C. men and took their weapons. But in late 1920 their intention definitely was to kill but 
they were not very successful in achieving this aim. In all of the long firefights, they seem to have 
withdrawn inflicting very little damage. Despite thirty-seven attacks on patrols, they only managed to 
kill six Crown Force and in the process they lost three Volunteers, yet they had the advantage of 
surprise and numerical superiority. Obviously their inexperience in battle situation was always going 
to be a major impediment. An ambush at Streete in July 1921, was botched owing to the premature 
discharge of a rifle, which enabled the enemy to take cover before the IRA had fully entered the
1 rn t
ambush position. Another ambush carried out by the third battalion at Auburn failed when two 
grenades which were flung into a lorry carrying Black and Tans failed to explode, as a result a 
Volunteer was killed.168
The Belfast Boycott was enforced in Westmeath, when it was re-introduced into the country in 
April 1921. There were five cases of trains being stopped and searched, one shop being cleared of 
goods and one barge being searched. There was a constant barrage of attacks on property and burning 
of buildings, with eighty-two cases of malicious damage being reported. Added to actions carried out 
by the IRA, was the contribution delivered by the general population. There were seventy-three large 
meetings held in the county where the general population showed their support, maybe not the IRA’s 
methods but certainly for their aims. Also the boycott of the police was strictly adhered to in some
164 C. Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellowes and the Irish Revolution. (London, 1971), p.51-53.
165 An t-Oglach, Apr 1921.
166 Cl Report for Jan-Jul 1921. These figures are not entirely accurate as they are concocted solely from police reports and 
many incidents were not reported to the police, but they do illustrate a trend.
167 McEoin papers. Statement o f Volunteer Seamus Conway.
168 Seamus O’Meara, Capuchin Annual 1970, p.552.
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areas. In his monthly report for August 1920, the Cl states, ‘in some areas the police are being 
boycotted every effort made (sic) to destroy their moral.’169 Earlier in June, the Board of Guardians 
ruled that the police were no longer to be treated in Mullingar District Hospital and train drivers 
refused to transport soldiers.170 However in October he states that the boycott had begun to slacken.171 
But in that same month, court had to be suspended in Mullingar due to lack of jurors. And by 
November it had come to the attention of the authorities that train drivers refused to drive trains
172carrying arms or ammunition. However there were only three resignations from the R.I.C. in 
Westmeath, during the entire war, which would point to the fact, that life was not made too difficult or 
intimidating for the police. The national average of R.I.C. resignations was ten per cent.173
The general public also supported the alternative machinery of government that Sinn Fein had 
implemented. The first sitting of a Sinn Fein arbitration court in Westmeath was held in Mullingar on 
the 21 July, Conor A. Maguire described the occasion -
‘The venue was in the county council chambers.. .All the prominent local solicitors were 
engaged... We were only just beginning when word was brought that the building was been surrounded 
by the military... Fully armed and accompanied by armoured cars.. .Kevin O’Shiel who had been 
presiding boldly stood up and declared “Gentlemen, we must yield to superior forces. It can now be 
judged, who wish to maintain Law and Order, and who are the disturbers of the peace’” .
The court was disbanded, later gathered in the Greville Arms hotel, it was decided that the 
court would go outside areas and deal with the cases locally. For several days Kevin O’Shiel moved 
about the country and succeeded in disposing of the business without again being interrupted.174 
Almost everybody stopped going to the official courts, preferring to attend the Sinn Fein courts -
169 Cl monthly report, Aug 1920.
170 Westmeath Examiner, 20 Jun 1920.
171 Cl monthly report, Oct 1920.
172 Cl monthly report, Nov 1920.
173 Peter Hart, The IRA and its enemies, (New York, 1998), p.94.
174 Conor A. Maguire, chapter entitled ‘The Republican Courts’, Capuchin Annual 1969, pp.380-381.
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‘petty session courts are almost nil, Sinn Fein courts deal with numbers of agricultural agitation cases 
and people appear satisfied with their results.’175
After the Local Government elections of June 1920, the entire local government of the county 
was immediately handed over to the control of Dail Eireann. From this point on, the Council became 
increasingly radical. An order was passed forbidding the secretary or any officer of the council to pass 
on any information to the Income Tax Authority, in connection with any business from the council. It 
was proposed to evict all crown officials from the courthouses in Mullingar, Moate and Athlone. A 
circular letter from the Local Government Board regarding TB patients was ignored, and it was 
proposed that the Minster of Health in Dail Eireann report on the matter. A new flag was procured for 
the County building. Following these open displays of defiance, they received a letter from the Local 
Government Board, informing them that there would be no more loans or grants, without definite 
assurance that they would submit their accounts for audit, and conform to their standard controls. They 
also received orders, that there would be no further payment from the Local Taxation account unless 
definite assurance was provided, that the monies would be distributed to the services intended. But the 
council continued to openly display their rebel sympathies; they adjourned for a week as a mark of 
respect for the death of Terence Mac Sweeney and again on the death of Kevin Barry. Following this, 
Crown Forces raided the offices of the council and seized the minute books, account books and letter 
book; they contained valuable information and a series of raids and arrests ensued.176
Protestant community 
Westmeath had the highest rate of big house burnings in Leinster with a total of six; in fact 
only two counties had more nationwide, Clare with seven and Cork with a massive twenty-six. It 
would appear that the six big house burnings can be divided into two categories, between two burned 
out of fear that the military would occupy them and rest were burned for retaliatory purposes. I believe 
that they were only targeted because of their vulnerability and because they would act as a deterrent to 
continued military destruction of private property. I do not think that these attacks were based on any
175 Cl monthly report, Jul 1920,
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inherent hatred for the local Protestant community, nobody was ever injured in the course of any of 
these attacks . There is not much evidence of sectarian bitterness in the county. The hunt was stopped
once at Dalystown.177 and a car that was used to convey people to the golf club in Mullingar was
1 -70
destroyed. There were Protestant homes raided for arms but Catholic homes were also raided. 
There was an isolated incident of the Protestant Church at Ballymore having its windows smashed.179 
But there certainly is not enough evidence to suggest that there was a reign of terror administered 
against the Protestant members of the population in Westmeath.
Commentator’s attribute various reasons to the fact that some areas became very active, 
whereas other areas witnessed no militant form of rebellion whatsoever. Rumpf and Fitzpatrick both 
dismissed the idea that you needed bellicose leaders, they placed more emphasis on the need, for a 
strong republican community. It was often complained that flat, open terrain inhibited guerrilla 
warfare. Commanders in Roscommon complained of this, but the most rugged areas were not 
necessarily the most violent, for example -  Donegal, Mayo and Galway. Other explanations put 
forward include how wealthy a county was, evidence of a tradition of agrarian violence or agitation. 
Within rural society Rumpf and Garvin have asserted the importance of a strong, rural, middle class, 
as a primary source of Volunteer leadership. The guerrillas themselves however, frequently declared 
that it was the poor farmers who made the best republicans. Rumpf, Fitzpatrick and Garvin have all 
proposed a relationship between the War of Independence and the agrarian outrages of 1879-1882. 
Also, logically the enthusiasm of an area would heavily depend on the competence of the local 
authorities in attempting to combat insubordination. Other contributing factors would be the strength 
of the nationalist cultural bodies. Augusteijn dismisses this viewpoint -  “ the language movement and 
to a lesser extent Sinn Fein and the GAA were important vehicles of organisation and radicalisation, 
but there was no direct relationship between the local strength of the Irish Ireland movement and
176 Minute books of the Westmeath County Council 1920, located in Westmeath county library.
177 Westmeath Examiner, 18 Jan 1919.
178 Cl monthly report, Apr 1921.
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violent republicanism.” Augusteijn points out that a convincing explanation for the differentiated 
development of violence in Ireland in the 1916-21 has not yet been provided. I believe that it never 
will be provided, there cannot exist a formula for the entire country, as every county is different, even 
more so every area within each county is different.
i fin
179 Cl monthly report, Nov 1920.
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SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE IRA IN WESTMEATH.
Chapter III
NUMBER OF BRANCHES OF ORGANISATIONS IN WESTMEATH, JAN 1917 -  JUL 1921
Jan
17
Jul 17 Dec
17
Jan
18
Jun
18
Dec
18
Jul
19
Dec
19
Dec
20
Jul
21
Sinn Fein 7 24 24 25 27 29 29 30 30
Irish Volunteers 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 10 11 11
National
Volunteers
28 28 28 28 28 28 28 18
Gaelic League 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 6 8 8
G.A.A. 22 25 25 24 27 25 26 25 26 26
United Irish
League
27 27 20 20 20 16 16 16 16
Source: Cl Reports Jan 1917 -  Jul 1921. (National Volunteers and United Irish League ceased to exist 
in the county and there fore their return is denoted as -)
As can be ascertained from the table above the only noticeable increase in the amount of 
companies was during the conscription crisis of 1918. In this period the membership of the movement 
increased from 149 in January 1918, to 738 in May 1918. The next marketable jump is in August 
1919 when membership increased to 1019, however this number falls to 928 the following month. But 
these figures are definitely misleading, in the extent of my research a more realistic figure would be 
less than a hundred men who could be relied on to carry out even minor acts of rebellion. Sinn Fein 
clubs spread like wildfire during the conscription crisis and remained at a high level then after, but 
once again the numbers on paper would have far outweighed the number of reliant, loyal, committed 
members.
180 Augusteijn, p.42.
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I have isolated one hundred activists, in attempt to constrict a social composition of the 
Volunteer movement in Westmeath. The Volunteers that I have chosen are the ones that cropped up in 
police reports and newspaper reports. As a result of these sources, the names that I have gathered are 
likely to be the most active members of the movement. In order to achieve an adequate picture some 
demographic characteristics of the Volunteers are compared to the community in which they lived in.
I was unable to gather enough information on individual companies so the comparison is very widely 
based on the entire county. Therefore there is no differentiation made between rural and urban 
members. There was a preliminary list of nearly two hundred but his had to be reduced, as many 
could not be located in the 1911 census returns. Many activists’ occupations were impossible to track 
down so I will refer to their fathers’ occupation as provided for in the 1911 census returns. It also 
makes no differentiation between the different periods of the war. Also no valuation as to size of 
farms of other landholdings has being made.
TABLE 4.
OCCUPATIONS OF VOLUNTEERS IN WESTMEATH 1918-21
Volunteers Volunteer’s fathers
Farmer/son (%) 16.6 32.6
Farm Labourer (%) 27.0 19.3
Un/semi-skilled (%) 4.2 13.5
Skilled (%) 25.0 17.3
Shop asst./clerk (%) 8.3 0
Merchant (%) 8.3 11.5
Professional (%) 6.2 0
Ex-military (%) 12.5 -
Other (%) - 1.9
Sample 48 52
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Source: 1911 Census returns for Westmeath, newspaper reports in Westmeath Examiner and the 
Midland Reporter and Westmeath Nationalist. Tom Cuffe supplied valuable addresses for some 
volunteers.
TABLE 5.
OCCUPATIONS OF THE ENTIRE MALE POPULATION WESTMEATH IN 1911.
Total Total as a %
Professional class 2,520 11.7
Domestic class 525 2.4
Commercial class 813 3.8
Agricultural class 12,498 58.2
Industrial class 5,086 23.7
Total 21,442 99.8
Source: 1911 Census for Westmeath.
I have deleted non-productive class to provide a better indication of the occupations of the males who 
are eligible to work.)
One massive assumption is being drawn i.e. that for some of the names that their fathers ran a business
and they did not work in it due to their age (i.e. their age in 1911 when the census was drawn) I have
made an assumption that they worked in the family business when they would have come of age in
1918. I have included teachers in the professional section.
As can be seen from the table above, the rebels came from a wide range of backgrounds.
However the core of the Volunteers were drawn from the agricultural sector. As can be seen from the
other table this is hardly surprising as a whopping 58% of eligible males worked in the agricultural
sector. An important differentiation must be made however between farmers and labourers.
Westmeath differs from the majority of counties because the IRA had far greater appeal to labourers,
than farmers in Westmeath. The norm was that labourers were too economically dependent on the
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large farms to be involved in the IRA. However of 43.6% of Volunteers coming from an agricultural 
background, 27% were farm labourers.
The commercial class make up only a minute 3.8% of working males, but yet they make up 
over 16% of the IRA, when you combine the sections of merchants and shop assistants. Contrasting 
starkly to the evidence in other counties, is the amount of merchants who became Volunteers, who 
owned their own business -  a total of 40%, all the rest worked in the family business. This runs 
contrary to the general tag that is normally applied to the movement, that of people with very little 
stake in the country, and therefore willing to attempt to transform the reigns of power, to improve their 
position and social standing. It is important to note that of the number of professionals I found, three 
quarters of them were Irish teachers, so perhaps this figure of 6.2% is misleading. Similarly a lot of the 
percentage of skilled workers were apprentices or in fact it is their fathers occupation. The movement 
did not attract people from the two extremes of the social scale, there was only one example from the 
upper class that of a doctor. There was also one of these boundaries at the lower end of the scale. I 
only stumbled across one name whose parents were idle. Those described as unskilled, held jobs in 
factories, on the railway, as carters or as drivers. The 1.9% described as other refers to just one 
Volunteer’s father who was unusually an R.I.C. sergeant.
Another huge influential pull on people to join was family ties and a long tradition of 
republicanism in the family. From these one hundred activists, there are five sets of two brothers and 
two sets of three brothers. However in only one case was their father also actively involved, 
highlighting the fact that the movement really only appealed to the younger bracket. Many fathers 
may have believed in the republican ideal that their sons were striving for, but disapproved of their 
methods.
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AGE
Table 6
AGES OF THE VOLUNTEERS IN WESTMEATH IN 1918
<15 15-20 21-26 27-32 33-38 39-44 45+ Sample
3 17 21 4 1 2 2 50
6 34 42 8 2 4 4 (as a %)
Source: 1911 Census returns for Westmeath.
Of the 50 sampled a massive 38 were between the ages of 15 and 26. Many commentators of 
this period attribute much of this youthful restfulness with the ban on emigration imposed on the 
country in 1914. The more adventurous or daring, who would usually have emigrated, began seeking 
alternative ways to express their defiance or frustration. However it is true to say that there was an 
outlet in the shape of the British army, which recruited well in Westmeath.
There definitely did exist a generational gap, which flung the young Volunteers even closer 
together, creating a greater bond and cementing the fact that they were rebelling against more than just 
the Crown Forces. The place of young men in early twentieth century Ireland was one of strict 
subordination to their fathers and employers. The sons of farmers and merchants usually worked for no 
pay and owned no property. It was realistically the case of waiting for ones parents to die, to gain an 
income and get married, because of this Volunteers could be deemed ‘boys’ well into their late 
twenties or even early thirties.181 Ernie O’Malley who trained Volunteers in Kilbeggan described rural 
families he encountered (not specifically in Kilbeggan) -
‘Home life was terribly strict. The men worked like mules and the women like slaves. The boy got 
the odd sixpence or shilling the day he went to market... At the beginning great courage was needed to
enable a man to leave home for some hours in the busy season, to leave for a day was wonderful and,
181 Peter Hart, p. 173.
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at any time one chose, nothing short of marvellous. I think great credit should be given to the young 
lads who risked parental displeasure and loss of inheritance by leaving home despite their parents.”182 
Shop assistants, apprentices for trades and farm labourers also all worked in similar situations with no 
or very low money.183 Added to these slavish conditions, their low-class status was further stressed by 
the fact that until 1918 these young men of no property were not allowed vote. It is no wonder 
therefore that they grabbed the opportunities that the Volunteer movement would have offered them. 
The movement would have provided them with something to do as well as entrusting power to them. 
The presence of these Teather-gaitered, trench-coated, rifle and bandolier slung figures of the flying
1 84columns’ must have attracted the awe of the public and the amorous glances of young women. It is a 
romantic way of looking at the organisation, but there must have existed some element of what David 
Fitzpatrick referred to as ‘thousands who saved hay in the sunlight, sought to save Ireland by 
moonlight’185
I found with the men I sampled, it definitely was not the case that the Volunteer in the family 
was the eldest brother, it was always very mixed even in cases were the eldest brother was in the ideal 
candidature bracket of early twenties. It is assumed that they feared joining because they had more to 
lose in the shape of their inheritance than their younger brothers. This would tie in with the fact that in 
Westmeath the movement was not community based. Perhaps it was always left to the rebel in a 
family, or through pure supposition the leaders may have emerged as the ones with the best oral, 
organisational or physical ability. Nevertheless there definitely existed a society which bonded these 
young men together and sowed the seeds of rebellion in their midst. Appeal of the movement was 
definitely concentrated in those between fifteen and twenty-six. Some counties like Mayo or Tipperary 
appealed across a wide range of ages depicting that the community there accepted the movement, 
whereas in Westmeath it was definitely more marginalised, serving a peripheral role.186 Hart describes 
why certain men volunteered -
182 ‘Ernie O’Malley,’Autobiographical Letter’, p.9.
183 Conrad Arensberg and Solon Kimball, Family and Community in Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 1968)
184 Augusteijn p. 134.
‘The decision to join was a collective rather than an individual one, rooted more in local communities 
and networks than in ideology or formal political loyalties. Young men tended to join the organisation 
together with, or following, families and membership groups.’187
In Mullingar, I unearthed sixteen Volunteers; six were from Patrick St., two of these were 
carpenters, one had a father who was a carpenter and two were brothers. In Kilbeggan there were the 
three Malone brothers, the three McGuiness brothers and their father. A natural leader, whom others 
simply followed, usually formed companies on local initiative. Ideal candidates were those who had 
just returned from serving with the British Army such as Tormey and Adamson in Athlone or Michael 
Gaffney and Bill Casey in Ballymore. They would have recruited their friends and neighbours and so 
formed a company. Others who were assured officer status were ex-prisoners, those who were 
interned in Frongoch, like Malone and Melinn from Meedin or Hurley in Athlone.188
We can witness a general progression in the case of a few selected Volunteers. For example,
• 1RQJohn Hurley from Athlone was imprisoned in Frongoch in 1916. It was here that his views became 
more radical, as he came into contact with like-minded people. He was released on Thursday, 3 
August 1916190 and it is he who we see at the forefront of activity in Athlone in 1917. In an R.I.C. 
report dated 27 November 1917, detailing a procession in memory of the Manchester Martyrs in 
Athlone we read ‘John Hurley, Main St., Athlone, Captain of the Irish Volunteers was in charge and 
wore Irish Volunteers uniform.. .gave a short address off the parapet of the dispensary.’191 In a Cl
1 Q9report of May 1918, ‘John Hurley, a prominent Sinn Feiner was arrested.’ In a raid on an arbitration 
court in Athlone on the 23rd September 1920, were there were 40 arrests, all were released the 
following day, except a John O’Hurley, then a county councilor.193
185 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life ¡913-21, (David Fitzpatrick, 1977), p. 138.
180 Augusteijn p.354-357
187 Hart, p.208
188 Sean O’Mahony, Frongoch, (Dublin, 1987), pp. 143-144, 212.
189 Ibid
199 Art O’Brein papers, (NLI, MS 84435)
191 R.I.C, report for illegal activities in 1917.
192 Cl monthly report, May 1918.
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George Adamson and his brother Joseph were the sons of a shoemaker, both had joined the 
British Army; through his experience in the Dardanelles, George became a Brigadier General in the 
Volunteers.194 Yet for a long period of the war, he was subordinate to Seamus O’Meara who was O/C 
of the Athlone brigade, but had no previous military experience. Joseph had fought in the 1916 Rising 
in Cork with “B” Coy., Cork Brigade, yet he served under Thomas Moore in “B” Coy, 2nd Batt., 
Athlone Brigade, who was a printing contractor with no military experience.195 J.J. Meehan was a 
member of “E”Coy, 1st Batt.196 Longford Brigade which operated out of Finea and Streete in Co. 
Westmeath, he was farmers son.197 He became O/C of the Inny brigade during the Civil War, 
illustrating that it was possible for those who were good soldiers to work their way through the 
ranks.198 Dick Bertles was a carpenter as was father, he become O/C of “B” Company, 2nd Battalion, 
Athlone Brigade, Michael Jordan is listed as having being a small farmer from Ballinacarrigy, yet he 
became O/C of the Inny Brigade, Michael McCoy was O/C of Mullingar, he was a carpenter and his 
father was a herdsmen. All these examples further reinforce the theory that the movement had 
egalitarian leanings, that a discriminated group in society were bonding together and fighting as much 
for equality within their local communities as they were for Ireland’s independence.
There is however some evidence to suggest that upper middle class people who joined the 
movement were more assured of obtaining the leadership of the political side of the movement.
Patrick Brett owned an influential business in Mullingar and he became President of Sinn Féin in 
Westmeath. Kennedy in Castlepollard ran the town’s hotel and it was he who led the drillings of 
young men in Castlepollard and also organised Sinn Fein.
Social strata within the Volunteers
193 Cl monthly report, Sept 1920.
194 Padraic O’Farrell Who's who in the Irish War o f Independence.
195 McEoin papers, MS 1556.
196 McEoin papers, MS 1686.
197 1911 Census Returns.
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HOW DID THE WESTMEATH VOLUNTEERS COMPARE WITH 
THOSE OF THE REST OF IRELAND?
All the counties differed widely with respect to the way their populations conducted 
themselves during the war. Augusteijn attributes this to the lack of central co-ordination in the initial 
phases of the conflict; this led to the impetus depending on local activists.199 In many ways, I believe 
that Westmeath followed the same pattern as the active counties in the south but perhaps eighteen 
months later. There is no doubt that once violence was engaged in, it set off a spiralling effect and the 
county became increasingly active. The war only really began in Westmeath in June 1920, and from 
that point on it remained active. Perhaps if the war had of continued longer it would have become a 
principle area of agitation.
Peter Hart in his study of Cork concludes that the Volunteers were primarily urban, with a 
large proportion of its members being comprised of skilled and white-collar workers especially as 
officers. In Augusteijn’s study of the counties of Dublin, Derry, Mayo and Tipperary he claims that 
the IRA drew on a wide range of society but not from the highest or lowest levels, he also argues that 
the active members were predominantly urban. He does however argue that farmers constituted the 
main body of the volunteers in the rural areas. Westmeath follows this trend in the rural areas, 
although there were many Volunteers from the commercial class in the movement, in the urban areas.
Conclusion
So in conclusion then, the Volunteers achieved their desired goal in twenty-six 
counties, but they failed to succeed in gaining independence in all thirty-two, they had 
compromised themselves, to what extent is the subject of eternal debate. This compromise 
resulted in a bloody Civil War that destroyed the movement. There is a massive poignancy in 
this, these young men had achieved so much in such a short space of time, perhaps because 
they gained so much so soon, it resulted in a fickle attitude, that they did not realise to what a 
degree they had succeeded. Undoubtedly it was a national effort, it is correct to revere the
198 McEoin papers,MS 1686.
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active counties of Cork, Clare, Tipperary and Longford, but I do not think that if these areas 
were the only places that were causing problems, the British administration would have found 
the necessity of offering a truce. The fact that the whole country was creating alternative 
systems of government, law and policing; as well as carrying out a constant barrage of 
ambushes and attacks on Crown Force patrols and barracks; is a more convincing reason as to 
why. But inactivity did exist. Are there reasons for explaining this inactivity? Westmeath had 
started late; the IRA in the county only really began in earnest as late as August 1920 and 
therefore was a few paces behind the more ‘active’ counties. The reasons for starting later? 
Impossible to pinpoint an exact reason, many analysts have attributed the reason as being down 
to a social aspect, that there were certain areas that had a prevalence of suitable candidates who 
would be willing to commit radical acts of defiance, but I think that this could be an example 
of being too analytical, every county if analysed deeply would have every type of social class, 
including those who were most likely to become radical. I believe the most likely reason is 
almost coincidental; areas that were premature in resorting to violence became more radical as 
their Volunteers became hardened veterans with extensive military expertise, who were able to 
inflict more damage when they attacked the Crown Forces. Therefore there is a great 
probability that activity was based to a large extent on the initiative of local leaders. However 
both Rumpf and Fitzpatrick dismissed that success in the movement was based to a large extent 
upon the presence of inspirational, motivational, bellicose leaders; they both place more 
emphasis on followers. Also it was often complained that flat open terrain (of which 
Westmeath is largely composed of) was unsuitable for guerrilla warfare, commanders in 
Roscommon complained of this; but the most rugged areas of Ireland were not necessarily the 
most violent, for example counties like - Donegal, Mayo and Galway. Other factors that 
various commentators have stressed as being paramount to activity include how wealthy a 
county is, how rural a county is and the existence of a tradition of agrarian violence. Fitzpatrick 
has argued that Irish nationalism was above all a rural preoccupation, that its most violent
199 Augusteijn, p.342
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manifestations were concentrated in the countryside. Within rural society, Rumpf and Garvin 
have asserted the importance of a strong, rural, middle class as a primary source of Volunteer 
leadership. The guerrillas themselves however have frequently declared that it was the poor 
farmers who made the best rebels. Rumpf, Fitzpatrick and Garvin have all proposed a 
relationship between the guerrilla war and the geography of agrarian outrages of 1879-1882.
In the course of my research I found that commentators’ views were constantly 
opposing and contradicting one another. Undoubtedly factors can be isolated as to describe the 
patterns that various areas followed but I believe that none can be regarded as being an 
absolute reason as to why certain areas developed along specific lines. I view it has being more 
the case of a conglomeration of reasons, reacting and acting off one another, creating a certain 
attitude towards the War.
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